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Judging Myopia in Hindsight: Bivens
Actions, National Security Decisions,
and the Rule of Law
Peter Margulies*
ABSTRACT: Liability in national security matters hinges on curbing both
official myopia and hindsight bias. The Framers knew that officials could be
short-sighted, prioritizing expedience over abiding values. Judicial review
emerged as an antidote to myopia of this kind. However, the Framers
recognized that ubiquitous second-guessing of government decisions would
also breed instability. Balancing these conflicting impulses has produced
judicial oscillation between intervention and deference.
Recent decisions on Bivens claims in the war on terror have defined
extremes of deference or intervention. Cases like Ashcroft v. Iqbal and
Arar v. Ashcroft display a categorical deference that rewards officials'
myopia. On the other hand, courts in Padilla v. Yoo and al-Kidd v.
Ashcroft manifest an equally categorical interventionism that
institutionalizes hindsight bias. To break with the categorical cast of both
deferential and interventionist decisions, this Article proposes an
innovation-eliciting approach. Inspired by remedies for cognitive bias and
regulatory failure, it gives officials a stake in developing alternatives to both
overreaching and abdication. Officials who can demonstrate they have
implemented alternatives in other contexts that are both proportional and
proximate in time to the instant case buy flexibility and dismissal of the
lawsuit before the qualified immunity phase. By leveraging officials'
experiences and expertise, the innovation-eliciting approach tames the
"pendular swings" in policy that Justice Kennedy in Boumediene v. Bush
viewed as undermining both liberty and security.
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I. INTRODUCTION
National security can turn on which flight to take. An official can put a
suspected terrorist on a plane with over a hundred innocent passengers, or
select a flight to another country, where the suspect gains first-hand
experience of "enhanced interrogation techniques." One influential court
recently cited this stark choice in a decision on the availability of damages to
redress extraordinary rendition.' Unsurprisingly, the court ruled that
"special factors" barred the claim.
The choice-of-flights dilemma exemplifies one of two conflicting images
of government action in national security cases. In decisions on access to
habeas corpus, the Supreme Court has portrayed the government as
manipulating the Constitution to evade accountability.2 Providing detainees
with access to habeas corpus curbed this manipulation and promoted
deliberation about the risks of monolithic political power. In cases barring
damage remedies, however, the same officials received a miraculous
makeover. In this domain, the Court has portrayed government as eminently
rationalS and plaintiffs as manipulating the system.4 These conflicting
images are not new. In the past as well, the Court has tried to maximize
i. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F. 3 d 559, 580 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
3409 (2010).
2. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2258 (2oo8) (holding that "basic charter
cannot be contracted away" by the government's placement of detainees at Guantanamo and
that provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2oo6 that stripped federal courts'
jurisdiction over detainees' petitions for habeas corpus violated the Suspension Clause). For
commentary on the Supreme Court's decision in Boumediene, see David D. Cole, Rights over
Borders: Transnational Constitutionalism and Guantanamo Bay, 2007-2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 47,
and Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Guanidnamo: The Boumediene Decision,
2008 SUP. CT. REV. 1. For additional insight, compare Stephen Holmes, In Case of Emergency:
Misunderstanding Tradeoffs in the War on Terror, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 301 (2009) (arguing that
judicially imposed rules are necessary to compensate for short-sighted executive policies), with
Eric A. Posner, International Law and the War on Terror: Boumediene and the Uncertain March of
Judicial Cosmopolitanism, 2007-2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 23, 39-46 (criticizing Boumediene as
unduly extending protections of American law to noncitizens not on American soil).
3. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009) (describing the round-up of
undocumented Muslim noncitizens after September 1 ith as a "legitimate policy directing law
enforcement to arrest and detain individuals because of their suspected link to the attacks").
The government's own report portrayed the round-up in a different light. See OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER iI DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE
TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE
INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER II ATTACKS 41-42 (2003), available at http://usdoj.gov/oig/
special/o3o6/full.pdf (concluding that arrests in the vast majority of cases occurred because of
"chance encounters or tenuous connections" rather than because of "genuine indications" of
terrorist ties or the possession of useful information); see also DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS
SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA Is LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR 30-31 (2007) (discussing the
post-9/11 round-up).
4. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (warning of excessive discovery burdens imposed on
officials by plaintiffs who will skew the theory of the case to unfairly target defendants).
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deliberation by limiting the volatility that crises often generate. 5 However,
the gap between images of government in the most recent decisions
threatens to accelerate the "pendular swings" that the Court feared.6 Closing
that gap requires an approach to damages claims that departs from judicial
trends.
Historically, the Court has sought to correct for errors in two perennial
perspectives on national security crises. Presentist bias (or "myopia")7 often
afflicts officials, who order short-term fixes like mass detentions or curbs on
free speech with troubling long-term consequences.8 To remedy this bias,
the courts have preserved detainees' access to habeas corpus and inferred
the availability of a cause of action for damages under the Constitution.9
5. Compare Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding constitutionality
of statute criminalizing failure to comply with executive order that Japanese-Americans on the
West Coast evacuate their homes), with Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 294 (1944) (holding that
Congress had not granted the President authority to detain concededly loyal Japanese-
Americans).
6. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2246. See generally Patrick 0. Gudridge, Remember Endo, 116
HARV. L. REV. 1933 (2003) (analyzing these decisions).
7. I use the terms "myopia" and "presentist bias" to describe a cluster of phenomena that
continue to challenge experimental psychologists. These terms have in common the willingness
of individuals to prefer, to a degree not consistent with expected-utility theory, a smaller
gratification available immediately rather than a larger good that is delayed. See Cass R.
Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1158-66 (1986); see
also Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, in BEHAVIoRAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 13, 45-46 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (noting
a tendency to inappropriately discount future costs); David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic
Discounting, 112 Q.J. ECON. 443 (1997) (arguing that individuals use "commitment
mechanisms" such as insurance policies or savings plans to compensate for tendency to unduly
discount the future); George Loewenstein, Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Projection Bias
in Predicting Future Utility, 1 18 Q.J. ECON. 1209 (2003) (analyzing flaws in discounting over
time); Daniel Read, Intertemporal Choice, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OFJUDGMENT AND DECISION
MAKING 424, 428-29 (Derek J. Koehler & Nigel Harvey eds., 2004) (noting tendency of
individuals to prefer "smaller-sooner reward").
8. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (requiring due-process protections
because giving an executive a "blank check" would threaten framework of liberty); cf JACK
GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION
151 (2007) (warning that legal memos with expansive view of presidential authority, prepared
by Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel and later withdrawn by Goldsmith as assistant
attorney general, could have provided officials with "blank check" for wrongdoing).
Sophisticated commentators preferring a more deferential approach accept the general notion
that temporal discounting is suboptimal, but disagree that courts are competent to cope with
this deficit. They argue that countervailing factors, such as hindsight bias, may impair courts'
ability to evaluate political branches' actions. Compare Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule,
Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991, 1029 (2008) (observing that governmental
institutions have a limited "time horizon" that fails to factor in harms to future generations),
with ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE
COURTS 4-6 (2007) (noting flaws in courts' decisions when reviewing responses to crises).
9. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
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Courts also correct for hindsight bias.10 Graced with the omniscience of
hindsight, courts and juries overestimate officials' ability to correctly decide
whom to arrest, detain, or interrogate. To avoid separation-of-powers issues
prompted by punishing officials for mere mistakes, courts have ruled that
officials retain qualified immunity from suit unless they have violated
"clearly settled" law."
While judicial correctives for both myopia and hindsight bias vindicate
values like due process and the separation of powers, they also reduce
volatility. Myopia and hindsight bias hold the rule of law hostage to wide
political oscillations. These occur because people facing losses are risk-
prone.' 2 Behavioral substitutions that adjust to changes in the law'3 may
to. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, in
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 7, at 95, 95 (noting that maxims such as
"hindsight ... is '20/20'" stand for the proposition that "[1]earning how the story ends ...
distort[s] our perception of what could have been predicted"); Neal J. Roese, Twisted Pair:
Counterfactual Thinking and the Hindsight Bias, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND
DECISION MAKING, supra note 7, at 258, 260-61 (defining hindsight bias as "the tendency to
believe that an event was predictable before it occurred, even though for the perceiver it was
not"); see also sources cited infra note 66 (discussing hindsight bias in greater detail).
1i. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 8oo, 807 (1982); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some
Confusion About Due Process, judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309,
338-39 (1993) (discussing the Supreme Court's effort to seek equipoise between protecting
constitutional rights and preserving domain of official discretion in damages actions); see also
Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 8o8 (2009) (revising sequence of analysis regarding qualified
immunity to allow the court to find that an official had immunity due to absence of clearly
settled law without first determining whether a plaintiffs rights were violated); Stephen I.
Vladeck, AEDPA, Saucier, and the Stronger Case for Rights-First Constitutional Adjudication, 32
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 595, 608-12 (2009) (discussing rationale for Pearson holding); cf Diana
Hassel, Excessive Reasonableness, 43 IND. L. REV. 117 (2009) (arguing that the Pearson holding
encouraged undue deference for official decisions). See generally Peter H. Schuck, Suing Our
Servants: The Court, Congress, and the Liability of Public Officials for Damages, i980 SUP. CT. REV. 281
(arguing that failure to curb damages actions leads to undue official risk-aversion).
12. See Thierry Post, Martijn J. van den Assem, Guido Baltussen & Richard H. Thaler, Deal
or No Deal? Decision Making Under Risk in a Large-Payoff Game Show, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 38, 40, 48-
49 (2008) (analyzing betting behavior); Emily Pronin, Carolyn Puccio & Lee Ross,
Understanding Misunderstanding: Social Psychological Perspectives, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 636, 639 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel
Kahneman eds., 2002) (noting individuals' "willingness to take foolish risks in order to avoid
certain losses"); George A. Quattrone & Amos Tversky, Contrasting Rational and Psychological
Analyses of Political Choice, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 451, 453-58 (Daniel Kahneman &
Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
13. See Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect: Textual Plausibility, Procedural
Formality, and judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 528, 53o n.3
(2006). Substitutions include legal behavior undertaken when other behavior is criminalized.
SeeWilliamJ. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, loo MICH. L. REV. 505, 575 (2001)
(discussing a drift toward legal gambling that would occur if only specific types of gambling
such as numbers rackets were prohibited). Substitutions can also entail conduct that is illegal,
but not penalized as severely, or behavior that is more difficult to detect or deter. See Tracey L.
Meares, Neal Katyal & Dan M. Kahan, Updating the Study of Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1171,
1174-75 (2004) (discussing substitution effects).
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entail risk-seeking that undermines the potential for deliberation among
divergent stakeholders. For example, when political dissenters lose faith in
the prospects for a peaceful transition from myopic policies, they may
substitute revolutionary action for reformist speech.14 Having staged a
revolution, some erstwhile rebels learn the wrong lesson, using the
machinery of the state to police the purity of adherents.'5 Remnants of the
former regime recoup, citing the rebels' excesses. In each phase of the cycle,
differentiation from the previous phase becomes a proxy for soundness on
the merits. A carefully crafted damages remedy restrains official myopia and
thereby curbs this counterproductive cycle. Viewed in that light, judicial
solicitude for free speech is not only an expression of constitutional
principle; it is also an institutional mechanism for safely containing the
sometimes volatile "experiment" of popular governance.' 6
Hindsight bias's role in the promotion of volatility compounds the
challenges that judicial review must confront. Theorists have observed that
subjects of regulation who fear regulators' hindsight bias become alienated
14. See CHARLES TILLY, FROM MOBILIZATION TO REVOLUTION 39 (1978) (discussing
movements' "repertoire of collective action"); CHARLES TILLY, THE POLITICS OF COLLECTIVE
VIOLENCE 34 (2003) (discussing incentives for tactical choices by political entrepreneurs);
Colm Campbell & Ita Connolly, A Deadly Complexity: Law, Social Movements and Political Violence,
16 MINN.J. INTL. L. 265, 276 (2007) ("[I]f the state represses nonviolent protest, dissenters are
likely to switch to violent tactics."). Those who distrust the judiciary's ability or inclination to
protect liberty will favor measures closer to popular constitutionalism, such as the regular
calling of constitutional conventions. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 45-46 (2004) (discussing Jefferson's views).
Constitutional conventions are also risky undertakings, since once convened they may not be
easy to control. Id. at 59-61. In contrast, when people oppressed by myopic governmental
restrictions nonetheless trust the system, they can mobilize to force political changes, as the
outcry over the Alien and Sedition Acts demonstrated early in our history. Id. at 136-38; cf
Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 1204 (discussing the
Founding Era debate over the Alien and Sedition Acts and noting that "constitutional meaning
was hammered out informally through political contestation"); Larry Alexander & Lawrence B.
Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594, 1599-1615 (2005) (book review)
(analyzing arguments against constitutional interpretation by people and elected officials).
15. See HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 98 (Penguin Books 1990) (1963) (noting that
the French Revolution, "before it proceeded to devour its own children, had unmasked ... the
chief actors" as lacking sufficient revolutionary spirit).
16. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,J., dissenting); see also
Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law,
122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1826-28, 1835 (2009) (discussing the institutionalist vision of
international and constitutional law as coordinated games in which parties bind themselves to
accept less desired outcomes in the short term in order to ensure gains over time). Cases like
Boumediene suggest that the government's extreme actions are more likely to trigger adverse
judicial decisions that restore constitutional equilibrium. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct.
2229, 2246 (2oo8) (expressing concern about political volatility); see also GOLDSMITH, supra
note 8, at 124-25, 134-35 (arguing that extremes in the Bush Administration's responses to
terrorism caused a backlash in courts).
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from the entire legal regime.' 7 They view the status quo as intolerable and
take unwise risks that undermine compliance. Since defendants in Bivens.
actions are subject to regulation by judges and juries, fear of hindsight bias
can make them unduly risk-prone. Officials who fear future retaliation may
cling stubbornly to power, doubling down on repressive measures because
they view the status quo as trending in the wrong direction.18 This risk-prone
behavior exacerbates the cycling that the Boumediene v. Bush Court sought to
curb. To reduce cycling and enhance deliberation, courts must strive for an
equilibrium that corrects for both myopia and hindsight bias.
Unfortunately, recent judicial decisions have abandoned this search for
an equilibrium and embraced categorical deference or intervention. In
Ashcroft v. IqbaPl9 and Arar v. Ashcroft,2 0 categorical deference carried the day.
Viewing qualified immunity as insufficient to protect against hindsight bias,
Iqbal dismissed claims that senior officials turned a blind eye to the
mistreatment of post-9/ 11 detainees. Arar precluded claims that defendants
aided an "extraordinary rendition" to Syria. Neither decision discussed
whether official myopia might have led to the brutal treatment that the
plaintiffs alleged. Instead, these decisions viewed responses to risk as binary,
requiring that officials choose between abusing detainees and abdication in
the face of terror.2 '
17. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 4-5, 35-41 (1992).
18. See Paige Arthur, How "Transitions" Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of
Transitional justice, 31 HUM. RTs. Q. 321, 354 (2009) (noting importance of transitions to the
rule of law of pacts that provide business, military, and political elites with guarantees of stability
to discourage risk-seeking by potential "losers" in regime change); see also DOUGLASS C. NORTH,
JOHN JOSEPH WALLIS & BARRY R. WEINGAST, VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL ORDERS: A CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK FOR INTERPRETING RECORDED HUMAN HISTORY 135 (2009) (discussing rationale
for pacts between elites); Mariana Prado & Michael Trebilcock, Path Dependence, Development,
and the Dynamics of Institutional Reform, 59 U. TORONTO L.J. 341, 369 (2009) (noting that
governments facing popular discontent "may be stampeded ... into the precipitous adoption of
new policies or institutions" that exacerbate underlying problems).
19. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); see infra notes 129-36, 145-48 and accompanying text
(analyzing Iqbal).
20. 585 F-3 d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010); see infra
notes 137-44, 149-55 and accompanying text (analyzing Arar).
21. For thoughtful defenses of this categorical turn, see George D. Brown, "Counter-
Counter-Terrorism via Lawsuit"-The Bivens Impasse, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 841 (2009) (arguing that
Congress should create remedies), Richard Klingler, The Court, the Culture Wars, and Real Wars,
30 A.B.A. NAT'L SECURIY L. REP., June 2008, at 1, 4, and Julian Ku, Accountability for the Torture
Memo: The Wrongheaded and Dangerous Campaign To Criminalize Good Faith Legal Advice, 42 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 44g (2009). For further insight, see David Zaring, Personal Liability as
Administrative Law, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 313, 317-18 (2009) (arguing that Bivensactions can
enlist courts as unwilling participants in policy disputes).
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The categorical-deference approach has an interventionist
counterpart.2 2 In al-Kidd v. Ashcroft23 and Padilla v. Yoo,24 courts evaluated
officials' decisions from the cozy recliner of retrospect. Padilla, involving a
formerly detained alleged enemy combatant's claim for damages, asked only
whether the plaintiffs rights were violated. The court collapsed qualified
immunity's core distinction between the present legal status of the plaintiffs
rights and their status at the time of the official defendant's decision. The
court in al-Kidd, a case involving a former material witness's claim that he
was wrongly detained, insisted on a distinction between witness and target
that would deprive officials of needed flexibility in transnational terrorism
cases. Ironically, the interventionist decisions posit the same binary choice as
the categorical-deference model: overreaching or abdication. Categorical
deference and intervention thus undermine hopes for equilibrium between
presentist and hindsight biases.
To salvage that equilibrium, this Article proposes an innovation-eliciting
approach to Bivens remedies in national security cases. Utilizing insights
from literature on remedying cognitive biases25 and regulatory failure,26 it
gives officials a stake in the development of a broader repertoire of national
security strategies. Officials must show that in other cases they implemented
alternatives to the conduct alleged in the lawsuit. When the alternative
dispositions are congruent, proportional, and proximate in time to the
actions at issue, the court rewards the official by dismissing the lawsuit prior
to the qualified immunity phase. Put simply, the approach exchanges
22. For scholarship justifying activism in constitutional damages claims, see Susan Bandes,
Reinventing Bivens: The Self-executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 289 (1995), Marsha S.
Berzon, Lecture, Securing Fragile Foundations: Affirmative Constitutional Adjudication in Federal
Courts, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 691-98 (2009), Gene R. Nichol, Bivens, Chilicky, and
Constitutional Damages Claims, 75 VA. L. REv. 1117, 1145-53 (1989) (arguing for elimination of
"special factors" test for availability of Bivens action), and Laurence H. Tribe, Death by a
Thousand Cuts: Constitutional Wrongs Without Remedies After Wilkie v. Robbins, 2oo6-2007 CATO
SUP. CT. REV. 23 (arguing that the Court had engaged in undue deference to the government
in Robbins).
23. 58o F. 3 d 949 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 79 U.S.L.W. 3062 (U.S. Oct. 18, 2010)
(No. so-18).
24. 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
25. See Baruch Fischhoff, Heuristics and Biases in Application, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVEJUDGMENT, supra note 12, at 730, 731 (discussing the importance of
feedback that subjects perceive as fair and impartial); Richard P. Larrick, Debiasing, in
BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING, supra note 7, at 317, 327
(discussing the value of group analysis of alternatives).
26. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note l7 (arguing that regulatory approaches stressing
cooperation are more successful than command-and-control strategies); Robert A. Kagan, Neil
Gunningham & Dorothy Thornton, Explaining Corporate Environmental Performance: How Does
Regulation Matter?, 37 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 51, 73-74 (2003) (noting the lack of efficacy of legal
sanctions); Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Law of Overlapping
Obligations, g CALIF. L. REV. 433, 470-73 (2009) (discussing new models of governance
emphasizing cooperation and dialog).
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officials' liability in a specific case for an overall increase in the cultivation of
alternatives. Over time, the innovation-eliciting approach will yield an
equilibrium between myopia and hindsight bias, limiting the "pendular
swings" in policy that Justice Kennedy identified in Boumediene as a central
threat to constitutionalism.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part II describes both presentist and
hindsight biases. It traces these biases not only through the cognitive-
psychology literature, but also through the Framers' concerns and the
Founding Era's reactions to the revolution in France. The discussion of the
effect of the French Revolution illustrates courts' concerns with seeking an
equilibrium between myopia and hindsight bias. A tilt toward either extreme
magnifies risk-seeking and volatility at deliberation's expense.
Part III critiques the categorical deference and interventionism that
have upset the landscape of constitutional damages claims in recent national
security cases. The binary choice that deference posits between overreaching
and abdication actively discourages the development of alternatives that
vindicate both liberty and security. The result in practice is categorical
impunity for officials. However, categorical interventionism does not
improve on deference. Interventionism also depicts officials' choices as
binary. In pushing officials toward abdication, interventionism fails to
generate nuanced alternatives. Moreover, the turn toward intervention
weakens the barrier against burdensome discovery that qualified immunity
provided. Categorical intervention in lower courts thus bolsters the
argument by champions of deference that qualified immunity cannot
adequately protect officials against hindsight bias.
Part IV advances the innovation-eliciting approach as an alternative to
the instability created by both categorical deference and interventionism.
Like prescriptions for debiasing decisionmaking subject to cognitive flaws,
this approach focuses on generating alternatives. As in proposals for
cooperative regulation, the innovation-eliciting approach turns away from
top-down models and instead enlists the expertise of the regulated entity to
craft solutions. Alternatives developed in this manner will have valuable
demonstration effects, building habits that diffuse the binary choices of the
categorical approaches.
Part V considers objections to the approach. Critics might assert that
the innovation-eliciting model encourages strategic behavior, allowing
officials to "bank" alternatives in unimportant cases to provide a safe harbor
in a major case. However, other constraints such as criminal law remain in
place to curb such conduct. Another criticism is the approach's apparent
downgrade of compensation. If the premises of the model are correct,
however, over time, harms will decrease as alternatives take hold, making
compensation less of an issue. Moreover, other doctrines, such as qualified
immunity and evidentiary privileges, limit compensation in the name of
more effective policy. Champions of deference may also argue that requiring
20l1o] 2o3
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officials to provide evidence of implemented alternatives expands discovery
in a fashion inconsistent with the Court's concerns about the burdens of
litigation. Here, courts can fashion doctrines that insulate official discretion
in particularly sensitive settings, such as military attacks. While each
objection is powerful, none trumps the benefits of encouraging official
innovation through a flexible approach to damages claims.
II. COGNITIVE BIASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
Scholars have argued for decades that pervasive biases infect human
cognition, producing distortions in decisions.2 7 Yet a pragmatic
understanding of these biases preceded this empirical investigation, playing
a key role in the deliberations of the Framers. The Framers understood that
political officials, courts, and the public share these biases, particularly the
presentist bias, which disproportionately stresses short-term outcomes, and
the hindsight bias, which makes every official mistake seem avoidable.
Correcting for one of these biases is difficult enough. In addition, correction
of one bias tends to magnify the other's effect. Corrections trigger path-
dependent perspectives on risk, as each correction intensifies the
countervailing bias and response. As an example, correcting for presentism
27. Cognitive psychologists call such distortions biases and heuristics-the latter referring
to simple guides to inference and prediction that serve humans well in many common
decisions, but can also lead individuals astray. See Gideon Keren & Karl H. Teigen, Yet Another
Look at the Heuristics and Biases Approach, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OFJUDGMENT AND DECISION
MAKING, supra note 7, at 88, 97 (noting that vivid risks skewjudgments of probability); Matthew
Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 11, 30-31 (1998) (discussing
importance of salience in human inference and judgment); Steven J. Sherman et al., Imagining
Can Heighten or Lower the Perceived Likelihood of Contracting a Disease: The Mediating Effect of Ease of
Imagery, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 12, at
g8, 105 (noting that vivid images, such as an illness with identifiable symptoms, raise probability
estimates of contracting disease even without objective evidence); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL.
207 (1973) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, Availability] (discussing the empirical findings
on vividness or "availability"); see also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional Versus
Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 12, at 19, 34 (discussing the
"representativeness" heuristic, which describes the tendency to draw causal connections
between attributes or events that are superficially similar). For applications of heuristics and
biases to areas of substantive law, see Donald C. Langevoort, Essay, Resetting the Corporate
Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent Financial Scandals About Self-deception, Deceiving Others, and the
Design of Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285 (2004) (securities law), and Peter Margulies, "Who
Are You To Tell Me That?": Attorney-Client Deliberation Regarding Nonlegal Issues and the Interests of
Nonclients, 68 N.C. L. REV. 213, 232-39 (99o) (unintended consequences and public-interest
law). See also Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crisis Always Be
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1019 (2003) (discussing cognitive biases in the war on
terror); Christina E. Wells, Fear and Loathing in Constitutional Decision-Making, 2005 Wis. L. REV.
115, 158-63 (same).
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(or myopia as some scholars have called it)28 often requires robust judicial
review of official action. Without this check, officials have little incentive to
avoid reckless decisions. However, fear of hindsight bias in a post hoc
evaluation, such as a damages award to a victim of a government decision,
also distorts officials' incentives. The result is volatility that undermines
constitutional deliberation.
A. PRESENTIST BIAS: SHORTSIGHTEDNEss, Por/TIcAL CHANGE,
AND THE RoLE OF COURTS
Human beings suffer from myopia or presentist bias. They stress short-
term risks and benefits, and inappropriately discount the long term. 29
Cognitively speaking, people perceive time the way the New Yorker in the
Saul Steinberg cartoon perceives location. The difference between today
and tomorrow is huge, like the distance between New York and New Jersey
in the artist's depiction;3 0 the difference between tomorrow and next year is
slim, like the exaggerated proximity of New Jersey and the Pacific Ocean in
the cartoon. Based on myopia, people will forego valuable investments that
incur up-front costs or engage in self-destructive behaviors like substance
abuse that are gratifying in the short term.3 '
The dangers of a presentist bias were not lost on the Framers. Hamilton
observed that the legislature was often susceptible to the "effects of
occasional ill humors in the society."32 These effects could prompt "serious
28. See George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, "We Can Do This the Easy Way or the Hard
Way": Negative Emotions, Self-regulation, and the Law, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 183 (2006)
("[Hiumans are inherently myopic.").
29. See Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, Time Discounting and
Time Preference: A Critical Review, in TIME AND DECISION: ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE I3, 32-34 (George Loewenstein, Daniel Read & Roy
F. Baumeister eds., 2003); Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 7, at 46; Laibson, supra note 7;
Loewenstein, O'Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 7. For a different perspective that nonetheless
supports the case forjudicial review, see Nira Liberman & Yaacov Trope, Construal Level Theory
of Intertemporal judgment and Decision, in TIME AND DECISION: ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE, supra, at 245, 247-56. Liberman and Trope argue
that changes in preference over time occur because people construe near- and long-term events
at different levels of generality, with more concrete images formed for near-term events and
more abstract concepts for longer-term events. According to the authors, incidental features of
choice that cause anxiety or inconvenience are discounted heavily over time but are prominent
in short-term decisions. Experimental subjects who feel visceral states such as hunger
overestimate the likelihood that they will experience such states in the future.
30. SeeJeanne English Sullivan, Copyright for Visual Art in the Digital Age: A Modern Adventure
in Wonderland, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 563, 616 (1996) (describing Steinberg's cartoon
as a depiction of New Yorkers' myopic view of the world).
31. See Drazen Prelec, Decreasing Impatience: A Criterion for Non-stationary Time Preference and
"Hyperbolic" Discounting, lo6 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 511, 513 (2004) (explaining
procrastination).
32. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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oppressions of the minor party in the community."33 Reinforcing this theme,
Madison noted that "indirect and remote considerations ... will rarely
prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding
the rights of another or the good of the whole."34
From the Founding Era. to the present, presentist bias has posed a
special risk in the domain of national security. Justice Powell warned against
the "tendency of Government ... to view with suspicion those who most
fervently dispute its policies."35 The ease of applying the national security
rubric to targets of convenience heightens the risk of overreaching.36 The
secrecy that shrouds national security decisions compounds the risk.37 While
Powell was alluding to the excesses of the Nixon Administration, his
description also fits the early years of the Republic. Most prominently, the
Alien and Sedition Acts sought to curb dissent from groups that sprang up
to support the French Revolution's aims.38
1. Constitutional Cycling: Myopia and Path-Dependence
Path-dependence can exacerbate myopia's effects. Social scientists have
discovered that a decision hinges more on the outcome of a previous
decision than on a rational examination of a proposal's stand-alone merit.39
Path-dependent effects can increase cycling and volatility.40 Cycling emerges
33. Id.
34. THE FEDERALISTNO. 10, supra note 32, at 8o (James Madison).
35. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 313-14
(1972), cited in Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 523 (1985).
36. Id.
37. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 522.
38. STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 590-93 (1993). For a
superb discussion of the lead-up to the enactment of the Alien and Sedition Acts, see Robert M.
Chesney, Democratic-Republican Societies, Subversion, and the Limits of Legitimate Political Dissent in the
Early Republic, 82 N.C. L. REv. 1525, 1536-51 (2004), and Deborah Pearlstein, The Constitution
and Executive Competence in the Post-Cold War World, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 547, 566
(2007) (discussing Alien and Sedition Acts). See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES:
FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION AcT OF 1789 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 13
(2004) (discussing history of governmental attempts to stifle free speech).
39. See Frederick, Loewenstein & O'Donohue, supra note 29, at 36-38 (noting that people
evaluate outcomes based on perceived departures from a current reference point); George
Loewenstein & Erik Angner, Predicting and Indulging Changing Preferences, in TIME AND DECISION:
ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE, supra note 29, at
351, 372-74 (noting that an individual's current state, such as hunger, will lead to incorrect
predictions of his or her state in the near future; the prediction made by the individual hinges
on the current state, not on the merits of the future decision).
40. See Adrian Vermeule, The Supreme Court, 2oo8 Term-Foreword: System Effects and the
Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REv. 4, 11-12 (2009) (discussing Condorcet's Voting Paradox); cf
Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARv. L. REV. 802, 815-21 (1982)
(arguing that, because of cycling, a multimember body, such as an appellate court, will display
intransitivity in preferences that violates principles of rationality). Path-dependence can also
generate more stability than is optimal when coupled with a strong preference for precedent.
See ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON 109-10 (2009) ("[W]here the common
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in multimember systems, including appellate courts or an electorate
consisting of Democrats, Republicans, and Independents. In these scenarios,
previous decisions will spawn a backlash and shifting coalitions, which will in
turn elicit a response and a counter-response. Each outcome will hinge
more on the prior sequence than on "bipartisan" or cooperative
decisionmaking independent of these agenda effects.41
Path-dependence also influences attitudes about risk. Prospect theory
suggests that an individual's immediate past experiences will influence his or
her attitude toward risk in a fashion that is inconsistent with utility. People
are loss-averse; i.e., they dislike losses more than they like gains. So framing a
current decision against a background of losses will encourage risk, as
people try to "change their luck."42 Under conditions of path-dependence,
entities, such as corporations, may also choose less-than-optimal results
because of historical influences on their rules and structure. 43 Path-
dependence is a notoriously "sticky" phenomenon: the responses that it
generates resist modification and revision.44 Similarly, partisans persist in
their posturing, although their obstinacy guarantees that the cycling will
continue.45
Under conditions of path-dependence, myopic measures can trigger
risky substitutions to drive a cycle of civil unrest. To illustrate these
"pendular swings," Justice Kennedy in Boumediene v. Bush cited the bloody
contests in seventeenth-century Britain between the King and Parliament
law starts, which is typically random ... constrains where it can go, and how quickly."); Oona A.
Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law
System, 86 IOwA L. REv. 6o, 606-22 (2001); see also Vincy Fon, Francesco Parisi & Ben
Depoorter, Litigation, Judicial Path-Dependence, and Legal Change, 20 EUR.J.L. & ECON. 1, 10-13
(2005) (noting how a strong system of precedent generates consolidation in legal rules).
41. See Vermeule, supra note 40, at 11-12.
42. See Quattrone & Tversky, supra note 12, at 457. In contrast, framing the same decision
within a domain of gains will typically encourage risk-aversion, as people strive to keep what
they have already acquired. See Pronin, Puccio & Ross, supra note 12, at 639; Kurt Weyland,
Toward a New Theory of Institutional Change, 6o WORLD POL. 281, 288, 307-10 (2008). For
example, parties in litigation who could settle for a certain loss will often elect to go to trial,
even when the low probability of prevailing and the cost of continued litigation make the net
expected outcome of settlement superior. Post, van den Assem, Baltussen & Thaler, supra note
12, at 67-68; Pronin, Puccio & Ross, supra note 12, at 639.
43. See Lucian Arye Bebchuck & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate
Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 134-42 (1999) (seeking to explain variations
from optimal business models among corporations chartered in different nations).
44. See Chris Mantzavinos, Douglass C. North & Syed Shariq, Learning, Institutions, and
Economic Performance, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 75, 76-77 (2004).
45. Partisan maneuvers may spring from a prisoner's dilemma game in which each side
executes the strategy that promotes short-term success. If we assume that both sides ultimately
benefit from cooperative solutions, the short-term strategy is another example of presentist bias.
See Jonathan Remy Nash, Allocation and Uncertainty: Strategic Responses to Environmental
Grandfathering, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 80g, 837 n. 126 (2009) (describing tragedy of the commons in
which multiple players exploit nonrenewable resources to the detriment of public welfare as
"multiplayer prisoners' dilemma").
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over the writ of habeas corpus.46 Charles I had sought to imprison four
individuals who had declined to lend money to the spendthrift monarch.4 7
Parliament sought to curb this power. Upping the ante against a background
of loss in prestige and authority, the King dissolved Parliament. Threatened
by loss of liberty as a result of the King's action, the forces of Parliament
became convinced of the need for even riskier action. At this point,
observed Justice Kennedy, "[c]ivil strife ... soon followed,"48 including
Charles I's beheading.49 In due course, the turmoil of the time led to
restoration of the monarchy.
During this volatile period in British history, decisions about
governance hinged on excesses that had previously occurred, as opposed to
the merits of underlying disputes. 50 Parliament's views were more consistent
with what the British call the "ancient Constitution."5' Nevertheless, the risk-
seeking on each side produced a cycle of unrest that went well beyond the
dictates of necessity, as the Framers recognized.52
2. Myopia andJudicial Remedies
Mechanisms such as judicial review and the separation of powers
institutionalize the Framers' insight.53 Justice Kennedy indicated in
Boumediene that habeas corpus provided greater accountability for the
46. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2245 (2008). For insight into the intellectual
underpinnings of revolution that illustrates this volatility, see MICHAEL WALZER, THE
REVOLUTION OF THE SAINTs: A STUDY IN THE ORIGINS OF RADICAL POLITICS 290-96 (1965)
(discussing origins of a turn toward violent change during the Puritan Revolution).
47. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2245.
48. Id.
49. See Daniel Bell, Ethics and Evil: Frameworks for Twenty-First-Century Culture, 63 ANTIOCH
REV. 207, 210 (2005).
50. Wise leaders understand this dynamic and reject myopic restrictions. For example,
while President Washington distrusted the societies favorable to the French Revolution that
arose during his administration, he recognized that criminal prosecutions would only "make
them grow stronger." Chesney, supra note 38, at 1559 n.i68 (quoting Letter from President
George Washington to Governor Henry Lee (Aug. 26, 1794), in 33 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON 476 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
51. See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAw: A STUDY OF
ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 44-45 (1957); Larry May, Magna
Carta, the Interstices ofProcedure, and Guantanamo, 42 CASE W. RES.J. INT'L L. 9 1, 99 (2009).
52. See Jonathan Turley, Senate Trials and Factional Disputes: Impeachment as a Madisonian
Device, 49 DUKE L.J. 1, 15-19, 40 (1999) (discussing factions and volatility in history of English
impeachments and noting that Madison structured the impeachment process to preserve
accountability while "protecting the chief executive from the direct factional pressures of public
sentiment"). See generally Steven G. Calabresi, Political Parties as Mediating Institutions, 61 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1479 (1994) (discussing the Framers' distrust of "faction").
53. See Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 16, at 1831-33.
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political branches, thus tempering myopia. 54 Courts have crafted other
constitutional remedies to mitigate myopia's effects. For example, from the
early days of the Republic, courts have awarded monetary relief to
individuals injured by official action in national security matters.55
Constitutional damages claims reached a new plateau when the Warren
Court decided Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics.56 While Bivens expanded the traditional palette of relief, the
Court's decision rested on the courts' equitable power to craft remedies.
Justice Harlan's concurrence famously opined that for Bivens, the remedy
for concededly egregious constitutional violations was "damages or
nothing."57 As an individual whom the Court assumed was innocent, Bivens
had no recourse to the exclusionary rule that the Court had recently crafted
to deter overreaching by law enforcement.58 Moreover, as Harlan suggested,
the courts' willingness to fashion a remedy was also an object lesson in the
value of the rights that the government had violated.59 Sending this message
was important even-or perhaps, especially-when few people would
actually litigate such claims. 6o
54. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2245-46 (2008); see alsoJared A. Goldstein,
Habeas Without Rights, 2007 Wis. L. REV. 1165 (discussing importance of habeas as check on
political branches).
55. See Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1goo) (ordering after Spanish-American War that
the government provide monetary relief to the owner of a Cuban coastal fishing vessel that the
Navy had seized during the conflict); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 173, 177, 179
(1804) (ordering Navy captain to pay damages for seizing a vessel in violation of a statute,
observing that instructions from the executive could not "legalize an act which without those
instructions would have been a plain trespass"); Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 64 (1804) (ordering Navy commander to pay damages for improperly seizing a vessel
owned by a national of a neutral power); see also Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 11 o
(1814) (ordering relief from official's attempt during War of 1812 to condemn as enemy
property cargo on a vessel chartered by a British company); Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, The
Presidents Power To Detain "Enemy Combatants": Modern Lessons from Mr. Madison's Forgotten War, 98
Nw. U. L. REV. 1567, 1597-607 (2004) (analyzing Brown). But see Robert Brauneis, The First
Constitutional Tort: The Remedial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century State Just Compensation Law, 52
VAND. L. REV. 57, 67-72 (1999) (discussing limits of early decisions regarding monetary relief);
infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text (discussing relationship between early cases and
Bivens remedies). See generally Berzon, supra note 22, at 691-98 (same).
56. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
57. Id. at 410 (Harlan,J., concurring); see also Brown, supra note 21, at 851-52 (discussing
the relationship between Harlan's position and the practice of implying private rights of action
in statutes); cf Walter E. Dellinger, OfRights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV.
L.REV. 1532, 1545-46 (1972) (same).
58. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring). Subsequent research has cast doubt
on Bivens's factual innocence, which does not justify law enforcement's abusive conduct. See
James E. Pfander, The Story ofBivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 275, 290-91 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds.,
2010).
59. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 411 (Harlan,J., concurring).
6o. Id.
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At the same time, Harlan recognized that countervailing factors could
counsel against affording relief.' Harlan's caveat echoed the prudential
note in Justice Brennan's majority opinion that "special factors counselling
hesitation"6 2 may preclude a claim for damages in other contexts. 63 Despite
this caveat, the Court may not have considered the full force of another
cognitive flaw: hindsight bias.
B. HINDSIGHT BIAS AND RISK: THE PERLS OFDOUBLING DowN
Like Karl Llewellyn's canons of statutory interpretation,64 biases often
come in opposing pairs. If presentist bias was the only problem afflicting the
government in national security cases, vigorous judicial review might
adequately deal with the situation. However, courts must also consider the
role of hindsight bias. Afflicted by hindsight bias, people overestimate the
probability that harm could have been prevented. 65 In reality, the perfect
storm is easiest to spot in retrospect: a harm often stems from an
unforeseeable confluence of causes.66 As the Framers understood, fear of
hindsight bias by courts, superiors, or the public can distort an official's
analysis of risk. The resulting path-dependence undermines stability in
government. While the Court's post-Bivens decisions sought to take
hindsight bias into account, the analysis in these decisions was often one-
dimensional.
61. Id. at 4og n.9 (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 n-5 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
62. Id. at 396 (majority opinion).
63. The majority placed the burden of legislative inertia on those asserting that such a
remedy was unwise by observing that Congress had not expressly ruled out a right to damages.
Id. at 397.
64. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950).
65. See Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned To Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in
Hindsight, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASEs 335, 342 (Daniel
Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982) ("Consider decision makers who have been
caught unprepared by some turn of events and who try to see where they went wrong. . . . If, in
retrospect, the event appears to have seemed relatively likely, they can do little more than
berate themselves for not taking the action that their knowledge seems to have dictated."). If
the decisionmakers are not sufficiently quick to blame themselves, the public will be happy to
pick up the slack. Id. For more discussion of hindsight bias, see Rachlinski, supra note to, and
Roese, supra note lo.
66. See W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against Corporations in
Environmental and Safety Torts, 87 GEO. L.J. 285, 300 (1998) (explaining hindsight bias in juries
assessing liability for low-probability but high-stakes events); see also Fischhoff, supra note 65, at
348 (noting tendency of historians to assemble tidy narrative, "with all the relevant details
neatly accounted for and the uncertainty surrounding the event prior to its consummation
summarily buried"). But see CARL T. BOGUS, WHY LAwsUITs ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA 109-12
(2001) (arguing that jury verdicts in product-liability cases are not excessive or unreasonable).
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Hindsight bias, like myopia, feeds on other cognitive flaws such as the
availability heuristic.6 7 Just as people overweigh present harms that prompt
vivid images and neglect more diffuse effects,68 a harm that has already
occurred serves as an "anchor" for assessment of the acts or omissions that
failed to prevent that harm.69 With a visible and vivid harm as anchor,
viewers typically find those acts or omissions wanting, even when officials
acted reasonably based on the information at hand.
In counterterrorism and ordinary law enforcement, hindsight bias skews
reactions to both false negatives and false positives. Consider false negatives
first. Suppose that a judge releases a defendant on bail after concluding that
the defendant was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community. The
defendant then commits a serious crime. While the judge may have failed to
adequately evaluate the evidence, the risk may also have turned on factors
that were not accessible to the court. Despite this possibility, people
influenced by hindsight bias assume that the judge erred.70
Reaction to false positives features the same dynamic. Suppose that
officials detain someone based on the assessment that the individual is
dangerous, but subsequent events demonstrate that the individual poses no
threat. In this context, people view the initial assessment as flawed. In the
glare of hindsight, the decision did not merely turn out badly, as any option
might given the multitude of variables that decisionmakers cannot fully
67. See Keren & Teigen, supra note 27, at 97; Tversky & Kahneman, Availability, supra note
27.
68. SeeJeffreyJ. Rachlinski, Heuristics, Biases, and Governance, in BIACKWELL HANDBOOK OF
JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING, supra note 7, at 567, 575-76.
69. See Gretchen B. Chapman & Eric J. Johnson, Anchoring, Activation, and the Construction
of Values, 79 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 115, 144 (1999)
(discussing anchoring); Daniel Kahneman, Illana Ritov & David Schkade, Economic Preferences or
Attitude Expressions?, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra note 12, 642, 665-68 (same); cf
Rachlinski, supra note 68, at 569 (noting marked increase in research subjects' view of need to
take precautions once researchers told subjects that a flood with ten-percent probability of
occurrence in particular year had actually happened).
70. See Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment with Sex
Offenders: Accuracy, Admissibility, and Accountability, 4o AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1443, 1488 (2003)
(noting public-safety concerns associated with false negatives in prediction of dangerousness);
Michael L. Perlin, "There's No Success Like Failure/and Failure's No Success at All": Exposing the
Pretextuality of Kansas v. Hendricks, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1247, 1253 (1998) (noting "worst-case-
disaster" of false negatives who are released and commit further violent acts in discussing
Supreme Court decision permitting detention of sex offenders after completion of their
sentences); Saleem A. Shah, Legal and Mental Health System Interactions, 4 INT'LJ.L. & PSYCHIATRY
219, 238 (ig8i) (arguing that public condemnation associated with false negatives skews
underlying predictions). Fear of false negatives helps account for juries' willingness to accept
expert predictions of future dangerousness in capital cases. See Christopher Slobogin,
Dangerousness and Expertise Redux, 56 EMORY L.J. 275, 31 1-16 (2006).
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know or control. Instead, hindsight suggests that the harm flowed directly
from obvious errors that a better decisionmaker would not have made.7 1
The Framers appreciated the volatility that hindsight bias could yield in
conjunction with path-dependence. In Federalist No. io, Madison decried the
toxic interaction of hindsight bias with attributions of bad faith among
political adversaries. Madison cautioned that because of "mutual animosities
[between factions] .. . the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been
sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent
conflicts." 72 For Madison, the readiness to cast blame bolstered by hindsight
bias had doomed previous attempts at democracy as "spectacles of
turbulence and contention ... as short in their lives as they have been
violent in their deaths."73 In Federalist No. 49's warning about overuse of
constitutional conventions, Madison sounded a similar note, explaining that
frequent resort to constitutional conventions would "carry an implication of
some defect in the government . .. [and] deprive the government of that
veneration which time bestows on everything, and without which ... the
wisest and freest governments would not possess the requisite stability."74
i. The Reign of Error: Fear of Hindsight Bias and the French Revolution
The Founding Era's response to the French Revolution also showed an
awareness of the perils posed by hindsight bias. Washington and his cabinet
expressed dismay at the maneuvers of the French Ambassador, Edmond
Genet, during the Neutrality Controversy.75 Genet's pursuit of risky
71. Those concerned about the significant problem of false positives will reason backward
in exactly the same way as those concerned about false negatives. See Norbert Schwarz & Leigh
Ann Vaughn, The Availability Heuristic Revisited: Ease of Recall and Content of Recall as Distinct
Sources of Information, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVEJUDGMENT, supra
note 12, at 103, 112-13. As with aversion to false negatives, aversion to false positives may entail
a mix of cognition, ideology, and principle. Informed opponents of capital punishment
concede, for example, that lists of "'the exonerated' include defendants who were not wholly
blameless." See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence: The Attraction and
Limitations of the Focus on Innocence in Capital Punishment Law and Advocacy, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 587, 597-98 (2005). Inflation of the number of factually innocent defendants
reflects a willingness to view assessments of evidence as easier than they actually are. A decrease
in false positives requires not merely the rhetoric of "innocence," but also systemic reforms
regarding evidence, including greater attention to the problem of inaccurate eyewitness
identification. See Brandon L. Garrett, judging Innocence, 1o8 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 78-81 (2oo8).
72. THE FEDERALIST No. lo, supra note 32, at 79 (James Madison).
73. Id. at 81.
74. THE FEDERALIST No. 49 , supra note 32, at 314 (James Madison).
75. Genet's rash acts included public disrespect for Washington and the outfitting of
privateers in the United States to prey on British shipping. See ELKINS & McKITRICK, supra note
38, at 332-53; Martin S. Flaherty, The Story of the Neutrality Controversy: Struggling over Presidential
Power Outside the Courts, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 21, 44 (Christopher H. Schroeder &
Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009).
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strategies suggested that he feared the tendency of the Revolution's
constituents to distrust their leaders.76
Leaders of the French Revolution, consumed by the threat of
backsliding, engaged in further risky behavior. For example, they
methodically impeded the development of institutional memory that arises
with continuing leadership by adopting Maximilien Robespierre's
suggestion to bar members of the constituent assembly from service in the
legislature.7 7 In another display of hindsight bias's willingness to second-
guess, Robespierre disagreed with those who deplored the Reign of Terror.
"Terror," Robespierre proclaimed, "is nothing more than swift, severe, and
inflexible justice."78 As Robespierre soon discovered for himself, during the
Reign of Terror, mobs convened as rump juries to convict and punish
leaders not deemed sufficiently risk-seeking.79
The French Revolution's hindsight bias made an impression on the
American most influential in the development of judicial review: John
Marshall. Marshall saw the risk-seeking behavior of French officials firsthand
during the infamous "XYZ Affair." As envoy to France prior to his
appointment to the Supreme Court, Marshall, along with his colleagues,
tried unsuccessfully for months to negotiate with Charles-Maurice de
Talleyrand, the French foreign minister. With France nearing financial ruin,
Talleyrand methodically declined to address the envoys' substantive
concerns, apparently believing that shaking down the Americans for cash
and threatening war over trade policy was a sounder strategy.ao Marshall
noted to his colleagues that this risk-seeking approach failed to achieve
French objectives.8 ' As Chief Justice, Marshall sought to curb the risk-
76. Indeed, the catalysts for the initial revolt also comprise a case study in hindsight bias.
These causes included not merely the cruel despotism of the French nobility, but also the
people's resulting willingness to blame aristocrats for uncontrollable events, such as adverse
weather that spoiled a harvest and ushered in a relentless winter. See Jon Elster, Arguing and
Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies, 2 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 345, 360-61 (2000).
77. Id. at 387. This suggestion would have deprived the United States of the service of
most of the Framers.
78. See Robert M. Maniquis, Filling Up and Emptying Out the Sublime: Terror in British Radical
Culture, 63 HUNTINGTON LIBR. Q. 369, 374 (2000) (quoting Robespierre's February 5, 1794
speech) (internal quotation marks omitted).
79. See 2 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, A LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 27, 43 (1916). The first eight
years of the French Revolution saw fifteen foreign ministers, including eleven who had been
executed, imprisoned, or exiled. Even Talleyrand, one of the most celebrated diplomats in
history, in 1797 was too insecure in his new position to offer candid advice to his colleagues. See
JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 195 (1996); see also ELKINS &
MCKITRICK, supra note 38, at 567-68 (discussing Talleyrand's precarious position with the
Directory that ruled France during the interlude between the Reign of Terror and the
ascendancy of Napoleon).
8o. See 2 BEVERIDGE, supra note 79, at 314-15; see also ELKINS & MCKTRICK, supra note 38,
at 568 (noting the Directory's risk-seeking approach to dealing with both the U.S. and
European governments).
81. ELKINs & McKITRICK, supra note 38, at 575-77.
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seeking that fear of hindsight bias yields. Although Marshall awarded
monetary relief against American officials in national security cases, he also
warned that the exigent circumstances faced by officials counseled against
"vindictive or speculative damages."8 2
Marshall's caution suggests the folly of reading too much into early
cases that awarded monetary relief against government officials.8 3 All of
these cases concerned the recovery of property, either in admiralty courts or
directly under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, which bars taking
property without just compensation.84 In such litigation, the text of the
Constitution itself authorizes relief,85 as it authorizes issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus to remedy deprivations of liberty.86 Moreover, in directing
that an official restore property to its rightful owner, these cases dovetail
with decisions permitting purely prospective relief against specific
government officials to prevent ongoing deprivations of constitutional
rights.8 7 The early cases thus do not support a free-floating warrant to award
damages for any and all official conduct that a judge or jury happens to
deem wrongful.88 Viewed with appropriate modesty, these cases are
consistent with judicial concern about the counterproductive effects of
hindsight bias.
2. Regulation and Risk-Seeking
Events have justified this judicial concern. Just as officials during the
French Revolution and its aftermath took greater risks because they feared
hindsight bias, 89 other more recent players have done the same. National
82. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 124 (1804) (reducing
damages paid for confiscation of neutral vessel).
83. See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 173, 177, 179 (1804) (awarding damages
for seizure of vessel returning from France).
84. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Brauneis, supra note 55, at 121 (tracing rationale in early
cases to language, purpose, and logic of Takings Clause).
85. SeeJacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933); United States v. Lee, io6 U.S. 196,
218-20 (1882).
86. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; see also Alfred Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM.
L. REv. 1109, 1124-25 (1969) (arguing that denying remedy in property cases would have
sanctioned continuing wrong, analogous to deprivation of personal liberty redressable via
habeas corpus).
87. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 167-68 (igo8); Eric Berger, The Collision of the
Takings and State Sovereign Immunity Doctrines, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 493, 512 (2oo6) (noting
tensions between permitting injunctive relief against specific government officials and doctrine
of sovereign immunity, which bars monetary relief against governments); Pfander, supra note
58, at 3-4 (discussing Ex Parte Young).
88. Indeed, judges in the early nineteenth century took the power to decide legal
questions away from juries, in part to promote stability in the law. See KRAMER, supra note 14, at
164-
89. See ELKINS & McKrrRIcK, supra note 38, at 569 (recounting the Directory's
nullification of elections and resort to a coup to counter popular discontent); see also Josh
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elites facing economic pressure and popular discontent may throw their
weight behind an authoritarian leader promising radical change. This
phenomenon characterized much of Europe in the 192os and spread to
Latin America.9 0 Elites authorize such measures when the status quo does
not offer stability and things seem to be "slipping away." 9 1 Moreover, risk-
seeking solutions of this kind often create contagion effects. Once a solution
becomes widely known, other officials and constituencies facing similar
problems embrace it, even when the landscape they face has a
fundamentally different character.92 Truth and reconciliation commissions
have emerged because the threat of more formal modes of accountability
can promote risk-seeking among governing elites, impeding transitions to
the rule of law. 93
A dwindling stake in the status quo can also drive risk-seeking behavior
in law enforcement. Scholarship suggests that risk-seeking conduct occurs
when police officers believe that a court will inappropriately second-guess
their decisions. Officers see themselves as a last line of defense against
lawlessness and view courts using hindsight bias against police as lacking
legitimacy. 94 Indeed, contemporary commentary cited by Justice Harlan in
his concurrence in Bivens95 suggests that Harlan viewed the Bivens remedy as
a substitute for the hindsight bias embodied in the Warren Court's creation
of the exclusionary rule.96 Distinguished commentators also suggested that
Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt of Congress, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1083, 1 10o-6 (2009) (noting
upward spiral of Charles I's risk-seeking, including his repeated dissolutions of Parliament).
go. See Weyland, supra note 42, at 307-o8.
gi. Id. at 3o9.
92. Id. at 309-10 (arguing that Mussolini's coup had influence in the Iberian world
because of long-standing cultural and historical connections).
93. See MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROcITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 148 (2007)
(praising restorative-justice mechanisms that promote a "forgiveness process characterized by
truth telling, redefinition of the identity of the former belligerents, partial justice, and a call for
a new relationship" (quoting WILLIAM J. LONG & PETER BRECKE, WAR AND RECONCILIATION:
REASON AND EMOTION IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION 3 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted));
Laurel E. Fletcher, Harvey M. Weinstein & Jamie Rowen, Context, Timing, and the Dynamics of
Transitionaljustice: A Historical Perspective, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 163, 184-85 (2009) (same).
94. See Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What To Do About It, 67 U. COLO.
L. REv. 1037, 1044-46 (1996) [hereinafter Slobogin, Testilying]; Christopher Slobogin, Why
Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 383 [hereinafter Slobogin,
Exclusionary Rule].
95. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
407 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing Alfred Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory
Power, 69 CoLUM. L. REV. 181, 182-85 (1969)).
96. See Hill, supra note 95, at 184 ("If the essential purpose of the exclusionary rule is
deterrence ... adequate substitutes may be judicially developed."); see also Akhil Reed Amar,
Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REV. 757, 81 1-16 (1994) (proposing damages
regime in place of exclusionary rule); cf Bivens, 403 U.S. at 408 (Harlan, J., concurring)
(approving "traditionally available ... judicial relief" made available in Bivens while declining to
endorse "special prophylactic measures" such as the exclusionary rule); Pfander, supra note 58,
at to (discussing Justices' interest in this point during oral argument). Justices have also
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the exclusionary rule (at least as applied to searches) could not possibly
deter a police officer from making a decision "on the spot."97 The Supreme
Court has crafted exceptions to the exclusionary rule based on officers'
good faith98 and exigent circumstances99 to mitigate hindsight bias in this
context.100
asserted that the right to substantive due process allows the subject of an egregiously abusive
interrogation to seek damages in cases where Miranda does not apply; for example, where the
prosecution does not seek to try the subject of the interrogation. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538
U.S. 760, 779 (2003) (Souter,J., concurring); John T. Parry, Constitutional Interpretation, Coercive
Interrogation, and Civil Rights Litigation After Chavez v. Martinez, 39 GA. L. REV. 733, 829-30
(2005).
In part because of concerns about undue hindsight bias, the Court has expanded the
"good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule. Compare Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct.
695, 700 (2009) (holding that the Fourth Amendment did not require exclusion of evidence
obtained after police arrested defendant pursuant to information that had been inaccurately
recorded in a database on outstanding warrants), with id. at 708-1o (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(arguing that exclusion of evidence in Herring would have provided incentive for modernization
of law-enforcement databases). For debate about whether the exclusionary rule and related
criminal procedure doctrines such as the mandate to provide Miranda warnings are
constitutionally required or exercises of the Court's remedial authority, see Dickerson v. United
States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (asserting that Miranda warnings are constitutionally required
and do not pose undue burdens for law enforcement), Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional
Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 30-50 (2004) (discussing formulation of prophylactic rules such
as Miranda that help prevent violations of constitutional rights), Henry P. Monaghan, The
Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975)
(same), and David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190 (1g 8 8 )
(same).
97. See HenryJ. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV.
929, 952 (1965) (noting that a police officer conducting a search that was subsequently
determined to violate the Fourth Amendment was "without a set of the United States Reports").
98. See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 700 (expanding good-faith exception to law-enforcement
databases). Herring reflects the interaction of rights and remedies that scholars have identified
in many constitutional realms. See DarylJ. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration,
99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 884-85 (1999) (arguing that over time courts will define rights to
mitigate difficulties encountered in rigid remedial regimes). The exclusionary rule also
triggered a political backlash that drove other substantive changes. Holdings such as Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), which limited law-enforcement interrogation techniques,
angered legislators, which caused them to broaden substantive offenses, including the laws
criminalizing drug possession. Because drugs seized in an arrest are typically dispositive
evidence of the offense, it was less important to gain a confession from the suspect. As a result,
the Fifth Amendment rights established by the Court posed less of an obstacle to prosecution.
See JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 29 (2007); Lawrence M. Solan,
Statutory Inflation and Institutional Choice, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2209, 2236-60 (2003)
(discussing factors that broaden the scope of criminal liability under federal statutes); Stuntz,
supra note 13. Since courts generally defer to legislative definition of substantive offenses and
imposition of penalties, the legislative response reduced judicial review of law-enforcement
decisions.
99. See NewYork v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
ioo. Commentators have noted that fear of hindsight bias from courts can prompt risk-
seeking behavior in other fields. See Mitu Gulati, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Donald C. Langevoort,
Fraud by Hindsight, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 773, 774-75, 778-81 (2004) (noting that punishing mere
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Some police officers seek to preempt second-guessing at suppression
hearings by offering inaccurate testimony.1o1 Knowingly providing
inaccurate testimony is a risk-seeking strategy, since detection would involve
employee discipline, possible criminal prosecution, and loss of reputation in
the community. Nevertheless, faced with a certain loss as a result of
perceived hindsight bias, some officers will take this risk.1 o2
The same dynamic regarding risk-seeking, stake, and hindsight bias has
occurred in the area of environmental regulation. Here, too, when
institutional reform proceeds through a command-and-control model,
officials lack a stake. Students of new governance and regulatory reform
have noted that command-and-control decisionmaking enhances
polarization. 0 3 Regulated parties often believe that the entity with the
mistakes in marketing of securities undermines deterrence by leading managers to reason that
they should double down on risk since even a mere mistake will trigger sanctions). However,
correcting for hindsight bias is a tricky business. A court wary of imposing hindsight bias on a
defendant may overcompensate for the bias, imputing responsibility to the plaintiff for failing to
avoid problems that seem obvious only in retrospect. See id. at 793-94 (critiquing courts' use of
"bespeaks caution" doctrine in securities cases as tilt toward defendants who issue boilerplate
warnings that a reasonable investor would disregard). But see Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 56
(2d Cir. 1986) (outlining "bespeaks caution" rationale); Jennifer O'Hare, Good Faith and the
Bespeaks Caution Doctrine: It's NotJust a State of Mind, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 619 (997) (defending
the doctrine).
101. See United States v. Restrepo, 890 F. Supp. 18o, 191 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding that
police officers lied about basis for search); 1. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83
IND. L.J. 835, 868-71 (2oo8); Slobogin, Testilying, supra note 94, at 1044-46; Slobogin,
Exclusionary Rule, supra note 94, at 376, 387-88.
102. Countervailing factors would suggest caution in invoking fear of hindsight bias to
dismantle criminal procedure protections. A system that fails to insist on high standards of
policing may alienate constituencies whose cooperation is essential for effective law
enforcement. See Capers, supra note ioi, at 838-43 (discussing attitudes within communities of
color); see also Tom R. Tyler, Stephen Schulhofer & Aziz Z. Huq, Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects
in Counter-Terrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans, 44 IAw & Soc'Y REV. 365 (2010)
(using social-science data to argue that perceptions of governmental legitimacy affect
cooperation with counterterrorism efforts). Some might argue that the legal system should
respond to inaccurate testimony by instituting more perjury prosecutions. Capers, supra note
l, at 838-43. However, the system has not responded this way, perhaps recognizing that close
relationships within the criminal justice system make such a response unlikely. See Slobogin,
Exclusionary Rule, supra note 94, at 387-88. Discussion of appropriate criminal procedure norms
is beyond the scope of this Article. My point here is a descriptive one: legal restraints can lead to
risk-seeking, rather than risk-averse, behavior. Cf Schuck, supra note iI, at 299-300, 305-13
(stressing risk-aversion as reaction to damages claims against officials).
103. See EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BooK THE PROBLEM OF
REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 107-19 (1982); Neil Cunningham & Darren Sinclair,
Regulation and the Role of Trust: Reflections from the Mining Industry, 36 J.L. & SoC'Y 167, 176-83
(2009) (noting a decline in disclosure, reporting, and self-investigation of incidents after
mining disaster prompted shift toward criminal prosecution for negligence in mine operation);
Kagan, Gunningham & Thornton, supra note 26, at 73-74 (noting that plant managers who
invested in technology and developed belief systems consistent with better environmental
quality achieved better results than those focused on compliance with legal norms); Christine
Parker, The "Compliance" Trap: The Moral Message in Responsive Regulatory Enforcement, 4o LAW &
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luxury of hindsight, be it a court or agency, has failed to consider the
regulated party's standpoint. Like other individuals who perceive a deficit of
procedural justice, 0 4 regulated parties become alienated from the system.
Rather than buy into compliance, regulated parties develop strategies to.
undermine it, often engaging in risky substitutions that further frustrate
reform. Companies subject to unduly rigid environmental regulations will
engage in resistance, including stonewalling on provision of information to
regulators, exploitation of regulatory loopholes, attempts to remove
particularly zealous regulators, lobbying to impose new checks on perceived
overzealous regulation, and a "scorched earth" approach to litigation. 0 5
Because of a lack of trust, companies will be less inclined to volunteer
information to regulators, thereby enhancing regulation's cost. Moreover,
regulated parties' concerns about unfairness have an adverse multiplier
effect, which multiplies cases of noncompliance, thereby exhausting the
resources of both plaintiffs and courts.
3. Cutting Back on Bivens
The courts' correction of hindsight bias has centered on shielding
officials with qualified immunity. In its decisions, the Supreme Court has
stressed the dangers of official risk-aversion, not risk-seeking. The Court has
recognized that the public interest and principles of separation of powers
suffer when officials find themselves in protracted litigation because of
"mere mistakes in judgment."o6 The prospect of subsequent litigation can
disrupt the President's ability to obtain candid policy advice 0 7 and respond
SOc'Y REV. 591, 592--93 (2006) (regulated parties are "likely to interpret [a rigid approach to
sanctions) as unfair or stigmatizing," thus adversely affecting compliance and leading to
lobbying to replace regulatory staff and impose checks on perceived overzealous regulation);
Clifford Rechtstaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of Environmental
Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1204 (1998) (analyzing failures of the command-and-
control model); cf Dorothy Thornton, Robert A. Kagan & Neil Gunningham, When Social Norms
and Pressures Are Not Enough: Environmental Performance in the Trucking Industry, 43 LAw & Soc'Y
REV. 405 (2009) (discussing difficulties of improving environmental performance in a mobile,
decentralized industry, like trucking). On the interplay of self-regulation and enhanced
compliance in the occupation-safety arena, see Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the
Workplace in an Era of Self-regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 344-45 (2005)-
104. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 163 (1990) (discussing difficulties with
sanction-based compliance and conditions for voluntary compliance).
105. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 17, at 47-50.
to6. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 8o8, 815 (zoog) (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.
478, 507 (1978)).
107. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 8oo, 817 n.28 (1982) (noting importance of ability
to "explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies ... and to do so in a way many would
be unwilling to express except privately" (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708
(1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Schuck, supra note i i, at 324-27; see also David
L. Noll, Note, Qualified Immunity in Limbo: Rights, Procedures, and the Social Costs of Damages
Litigation Against Public Officials, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 918-ig (2008) (discussing the Court's
rationale). The Court has struck the balance differently regarding claims of absolute immunity.
218 [Vol. g6:195
JUDGING MYOPIA IN HINDSIGHT
to unforeseen events.os Without qualified immunity, an official making a
difficult decision becomes a hostage to hindsight bias, which transforms
mistakes into products of "dishonest or vindictive motives."109 This tendency
to attribute bad motives to opponents pervades times of political
transition. 'o
In addition to recognizing qualified immunity for government officials,
the Supreme Court has also curbed the influence of hindsight bias by
cutting back directly on Bivens actions, finding in several contexts "special
factors counselling hesitation" in the recognition of a Bivens claim. Courts
have refused to recognize claims for damages where Congress has
established comprehensive remedial schemes."' The Court has also
declined to recognize a Bivens action in cases arising out of military
service." 2 In addition, the Court has cast doubt on the availability of
damages under the Constitution where a claim concerned conduct abroad
that allegedly injured a foreign national." 3
However, in its eagerness to prevent inappropriate second-guessing of
official action, the Court has overcompensated. Correcting for hindsight
bias against defendants often yields hindsight bias against plaintiffs. In the
See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 246 (1979) (finding absolute immunity for a member of
Congress based on Speech or Debate Clause, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6, cl. i); Hill, supra note 86,
at 1148. But see Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 521-23 (1985) (no absolute immunity
regarding allegations of illegal wire-tapping; absolute immunity would be inappropriate since
secrecy of national security decisions would otherwise heighten risk of abuse and overreaching).
to8. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 (noting the importance of the President's capacity to act
"with independence and without fear of consequences" (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
554 (1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
og. Id. at 815 n.23 (citing Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378 (1951) (barring suit
against legislative antisubversive committee).
iso. See id. (noting influence of "political passion" (quoting Tenney, 341 U.S. at 378)
(internal quotation marks omitted)); cf Rachlinski, supra note 68, at 568-69 (discussing
cognitive tendency, known as "fundamental attribution error," to impute bad motives to
individuals, which can prejudice defendants).
11 1. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) (denying claims for damages arising from
improper denial of social-security disability benefits); cf Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19-20
(1980) (holding that the availability of a remedy under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA")
did not bar Bivens action); Castaneda v. United States, 546 F. 3 d 682, 692 (9 th Cir. 2008)
(holding that the availability of a remedy under the FTCA did not bar Bivens action against
officials of the Public Health Service), rev'd sub nom., Hui v. Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. 1845 (2010);
John F. Preis, Constitutional Enforcement by Proxy, 95 VA. L. REV. 1663 (2009) (discussing cases).
112. See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 298 (1983) (barring Bivens action by minority
service personnel charging racial discrimination); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950)
(barring FTCA suits against the United States for actions arising out of military service); cf
United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 681 (1987) (declining to create remedy for victims of
LSD experiments in the military).
113. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002). For a more categorical ruling against
such actions, see Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1985), which
precluded suit against President Reagan for alleged "Contra" abuses in Nicaragua.
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most criticized case, Wilkie v. Robbins,"4 the Court refused to permit a Bivens
remedy for a property owner who alleged that officials had retaliated against
him when he refused the federal government's demand for an easement.
The Court seemed to suggest that the plaintiff should have availed himself
of other remedies despite their futility,15 or perhaps even acceded to the
government's demands, which the Court charitably described as tough
negotiation"16 rather than a pattern of egregious harassment." 7 Another
case, Hartman v. Moore," 8 which also concerned a claim of government
retaliation, further presaged the categorically deferential results in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal and Arar v. Ashcroft. In Moore, the Court held that a plaintiff had to
prove the absence of probable cause to prevail on a claim that officials had
engineered a prosecution in retaliation for his opposition to government
policy.1 9 The Court imposed this burden on the plaintiff despite his
submission of concrete evidence that the defendants had harbored a
retaliatory animus.12o As Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent, shifting the
burden to the defendant upon such a showing would have been fairer and
more efficient.121
Three additional factors suggest that the Court would be wise to view
the availability of a Bivens remedy as the default position instead of
regarding it as the exception. First, the Court's reluctance clashes with the
liability of state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.122 This liability differential
encourages officials to manipulate the allocation of roles in joint state-
federal operations.12 3 Second, Congress has arguably acquiesced in the
broader availability of Bivens actions through reenactment of statutes that
addressed federal officials' exposure. Congress expressly exempted Bivens
actions when it enacted the Westfall Act, which largely immunized federal
officials from state-law tort liability.' 2 4 Third, regardless of Congress's stance,
Justice Harlan had a point in tying Bivens actions to enforcement of
constitutional norms: in some situations, no other relief will provide
adequate vindication for constitutional protections.
114. 551 U.S. 537 (2007).
115. Id. at 552-53.
1 16. Id. at 558 n. io.
117. See Tribe, supra note 22.
i18. 547 U.S. 250 (2006).
iig. Id. at 263-64.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 266 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
122. SeeJames E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitutional
Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 1 17, 140-41 (2009); Hill, supra note 86, at 1154--55.
123. See Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 122, at 140.
124. See Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation (Westfall) Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. loo-694, § 5, 102 Stat. 4563, 4564 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (2) (A)
(2oo6)), discussed in Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 1 22, at 122-23.
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C. SUMMARY
Protections against both myopia and hindsight bias exist in an uneasy
balance in the jurisprudence of constitutional remedies. Without remedies,
myopia has free reign. However, unduly intrusive remedies can foster either
official paralysis, or (even worse) a culture of reckless risk-seeking.
Ultimately, it is the courts' responsibility to shape remedies to avoid
hindsight bias and decide when the lack of a remedy undermines
constitutional compliance.'5 Courts may learn too late that blocking Bivens
remedies undermines constitutional protections. At that point, hindsight
will be of no help. This caveat fits the courts' categorical approach in recent
national security cases.
III. THE INADEQUACY OF CATEGORICAL APPROACHES
While dealing with the presentist and hindsight biases requires careful
analysis of institutional structure and incentives, courts have largely
responded with categorical approaches. In decisions that appear most likely
to be influential, courts have displayed categorical deference, precluding
Bivens actions and encouraging officials' unwise risk-seeking behaviors. 126
Other cases opt for categorical interventionism.127 Both approaches have
their perils.
A. DEFERENTIAL COURTS
A number of decisions have expressed a categorical deference to
executive decisions, either ruling out theories of liability for senior officials
or holding that special factors ruled out even making a Bivens claim
available.128 Building on precedents like Wilkie v. Robbins, these cases have
125. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603, 604-05 (1988) (favoring availability of judicial
review); Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 68o-81 (1986) (same); see
also Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749 (2009) (finding that the judiciary Act of 1789 embodies
presumption that interim remedies are available to facilitate judicial review); cf Stephen I.
Vladeck, Boumediene's Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the Separation of Powers, 84 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 2107, 2125-35 (2o09) (discussing precedent).
126. SeeAshcroftY. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3 d 559 (2d Cir.
2009) (en banc), cert. denied 13o S. Ct. 3409 (2010).
127. See al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 58o F.3 d 949 (9 th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 79 U.S.L.W. 3o62
(U.S. Oct. 18, 2010) (No. io-98); Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1031 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
Ironically, interventionist cases may ultimately bolster the trend toward deference by suggesting
that qualified immunity is insufficient protection for official decisions.
128. In addition to Iqbal and Arar, other courts have expressed deference. Wilson v. Libby,
535 F.3 d 697 (D.C. Cir. 2oo8) (denying relief), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2825 (20og); Al-Zahrani
v. Rumsfeld, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103, 108-12 (D.D.C. 2010) (ruling against Guantanamo
detainees on both qualified immunity and "special factors counseling hesitation" grounds); see
also In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 93-107 (D.D.C. 2007) (barring Bivens
remedy for Iraq and Afghanistan detainees); cf Stephen I. Vladeck, Essay, National Security and
Bivens After Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CIARK L. REv. 255 (2010) (criticizing cases for making Bivens
remedy generally unavailable in national security cases). Compare Rasul v. Myers (Rasul II), 563
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further marginalized Bivens. To reach this result, courts have relied on a
rigid view of causes of action, officials' tactical options, and the nature of
official decisionmaking. Courts have also failed to acknowledge that
depriving victims of remedies for official overreaching can trigger
substitutions that often have more disruptive consequences.
Consider Ashcroft v. Iqba in which the Court held that senior officials
could not be liable for failing to properly supervise subordinates who
engaged in abuse of post-9/ 11 immigrant detainees.' 2 9 The Court ruled that
senior officials were not accountable even if they had knowledge of the
abuse.' 30 The Court's preclusion of supervisory-liability claims against senior
officials was precipitous at best. Media reports of widespread abuse of
detainees by jailers and other inmates were rampant shortly after the round-
up began.' 31 This evidence was ample to allow the inference that officials
had "turn[ed] a blind eye" toward the abuse committed by subordinates.'32
Federal appellate judges, including then-Judge Roberts, had repeatedly held
that such recklessness sufficed for liability.133 An appropriately tailored
decision could have protected officials from undue chilling effects, while still
permitting the plaintiffs to prove that officials knew early on about abuse of
detainees and did nothing to stop it.
Rather than adopt this approach, the Court equated all forms of
supervisory liability with respondeat superior, asserting that in Bivens actions,
F.3 d 527, 529-32 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that defendants were entitled to qualified
immunity because application of the Constitution to Guantanamo detainees was unclear before
the Court's decision in Boumediene), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013, with Rasul v. Myers (Rasull),
512 F.3 d 644, 672-73 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Brown, J., concurring) (arguing that Bivens remedy is
barred for "alleged enemy combatants"), vacated and remanded, 129 S. Ct. 763 (2008).
129. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937; see OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 3, at 43-80
(discussing excess time in detention after detainees were cleared of terrorism charges); id. at
130-49 (describing lack of access to counsel and claims of physical abuse, which the OIG found
credible). The round-up that gave rise to the claims centered on noncitizens from the Middle
East and South Asia. For a discussion of profiling and counterterrorism policy, see Stephen J.
Ellmann, Racial Profiling and Terrorism, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 675 (2003) (discussing pros and
cons of a range of profiling techniques).
130. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1952 ("[Officials] cannot be held liable unless they themselves
acted on account of a constitutionally protected characteristic." (emphasis added)).
131. See, e.g., William Carlsen, Rights Violations, Abuses Alleged by Detainees; Beatings, Lack of
Legal Representation Cited, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 19, 2001, 2001 WLNR 5774244; Edward Hegstrom,
Foreign Student Tells of Beatings by Inmates in Mississippi Cell, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 29, 2001, 2001
WLNR 11722903 (detailing abuses just over a week after round-up began); Richard A. Serrano,
Many Held in Terror Probe Report Rights Being Abused, L.A.TIMEs, Oct. 15, 2001, atAi.
132. Int'l Action Ctr. v. United States, 365 F-3 d 20, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Jones v.
City of Chi., 856 F.2d 985, 992 ( 7 th Cir. 1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
133. See id. A recent district court decision narrowly construed this portion of the Iqbal
holding, finding that U.S. citizens detained by the American military in Iraq on suspicion of
aiding rebels could proceed with their claim that former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had
personally ordered the use of harsh interrogation tactics against them. See Vance v. Rumsfeld,
694 F. Supp. 2d 957, 971 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
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"masters ... [should] not answer for the torts of their servants."13 4 However,
as Justice Souter noted in his dissent, supervisory liability differs significantly
from respondeat superior. In the latter, an entity is liable for the acts of its
employees, whether or not senior officials actually knew or could have
known about the employees' wrongdoing.' 3 5 In contrast, as Justice Souter
pointed out, the supervisory-liability theory advanced by the Iqbal plaintiffs
hinged on the recklessness or indifference of the senior officials themselves.
However, this distinction was lost on the Court.' 36
Similarly, in Arar v. Ashcroft, which concerned the plaintiffs alleged
extraordinary rendition to Syria, the court made a categorical distinction
between habeas petitions and damages claims. The Arar court argued that
damages claims could result in disclosure of sensitive information such as
dealings between the United States and other nations.'37 However, this risk
is also present in detainee habeas proceedings'3 8 and criminal
134. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
135. See id. at 1958 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04
(2005))-
136. The Court in Iqbal could also have avoided the supervisory-liability issue. The
defendants had conceded that liability was appropriate if they had been "deliberately
indifferent" to reports of abuse. Id. at 1956. As a result, the parties never briefed the existence
vel non of supervisory liability. Id. at 1957 (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 8o8, 820
(2009) (noting dangers of "bad decisionmaking" when briefing is "woefully inadequate")).
137. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3 d 559 576-77 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 3409 (2010). In other cases involving extraordinary rendition, the government has asserted
the state-secrets privilege, which can either be a substantive basis for dismissal of a lawsuit or an
evidentiary privilege that will result in nondisclosure of certain information. Compare EI-Masri v.
United States, 479 F.3 d 296, 306-13 (4 th Cir. 2007) (dismissing claim), with Mohamed v.
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 579 F.3 d 943, 953-58 (9 th Cir. 2009) (refusing to dismiss claim
against private contractor allegedly involved in rendition program despite government's
assertion of state-secrets privilege), rev'd, No. 08-15693, 2010 WL 3489913 (9 th Cir. Sept. 8,
2010) (dismissing claim). See generally United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953)
(recognizing substantive privilege); Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. s (2005) (same); Robert M.
Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 CEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249
(2007) (analyzing doctrine and suggesting alternative formulations that would better reconcile
the government's legitimate need to protect information and plaintiffs' access to the courts). In
addition to the need to protect sensitive information, the government may invoke the privilege
to conceal evidence that is embarrassing. STEPHEN DYcus, ARTHUR L. BERNEY, WILLIAM C. BANKS
& PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAw 1043 (4 th ed. 2007) (noting that disclosures
after the Reynolds decision indicated that the government invoked the privilege to conceal
evidence of human error).
138. See BENJAMIN WITrES, ROBERT CHESNEY & RABEA BENHALIM, THE BROOKINGS INST., THE
EMERGING LAW OF DETENTION: THE GUANTANAMO HABEAS CASES AS LAWMAKING 39-41 (2010)
(discussing evaluation of redacted intelligence reports submitted by the government in habeas
proceedings); Matthew C. Waxman, Guantdnamo, Habeas Corpus, and Standards of Proof Viewing
the Law Through Multiple Lenses, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 245, 258-63 (2009) (comparing
analysis of intelligence reports by habeas courts with standard for targeted killing of suspected
terrorists).
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prosecutions.' 3 9 The criminal context has seen the most sophisticated
approach, hinging on the government's use of in camera and ex parte
presentations, followed by agreed-upon summaries and substitutions like
those provided for under the Classified Information Procedures Act. 140 The
expertise cultivated by courts in this complex area is transferable to the
Bivens context.'1'
Detainees' access to habeas and other forms of contemporaneous
judicial review is also subject to unusual barriers. Arar alleged that the
government had systematically deprived him of his right to seek judicial
review of his deportation by serving him with a deportation order after
officials had placed him on a flight to the Middle East.'4 2 In Boumediene v.
Bush, which struck down the portion of the Military Commissions Act of
2oo6 limiting access to habeas corpus for Guantanamo detainees, Justice
Kennedy observed that a number of detainees had waited six years without
meaningful judicial review.'4 3 This hardly makes habeas the kind of
regularly available remedy that supplanted Bivens actions in earlier cases. 144
1. Deference and Plausibility Pleading
The deferential approach has also interacted with the Court's new
"plausibility pleading" jurisprudence' 45 to make senior officials practically
immune from suit. In Iqbal, once the Court had dismissed the supervisory-
liability claim, it readily disposed of a claim asserting that the senior officials
had ordered the post-9/11 detentions because of religious, national, or
139. See In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3 d 157, 165-67 (2d
Cir. 2008) (discussing measures taken to protect sensitive information), cert. denied 130 S. Ct.
1050 (2010).
140. See RICHARD B. ZABEL &JAMESJ. BENJAMINJR., HUM. RTS. FIRST, IN PURSUIT OFJUSTICE:
PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 81--go (2008), available at http://www.
humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/o8052 1-USLS-pursuit-justice.pdf (analyzing criminal prosecutions).
141. The Arar majority also asserted that it is best to preclude a claim altogether rather than
risk the distrust generated by procedures to accommodate the government's need for secrecy.
Arar, 585 F-3 d at 576-77. However, this argument proves too much. All legal proceedings hinge
on compromises of various kinds-ordinary evidentiary privileges, such as the attorney-client
privilege, also conceal information. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). We
live within these constraints because the alternative would be the abandonment of
accountability.
142. Arar, 585 F. 3 d at 571.
143. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2275 (2008) ("[T]he costs of delay can no
longer be borne by those who are held in custody.").
144. See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) (dealing with hearings pursuant to
social-security-disability-claims procedure); cf Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19-20 (1980)
(holding that the FTCA did not preempt a Bivens action).
145. See generally Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 849 (2010); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility
Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431 (2oo8); Rakesh N. Kilaru, Comment, The New Rule 12(b)(6):
Twombly, Iqbal, and the Paradox of Pleading, 62 STAN. L. REV. 905 (2010).
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ethnic bias.'4 6 According to the Court, the plaintiffs had not included
specific facts in their pleadings that would have made such a charge
plausible.' 47 However, this holding put plaintiffs in a catch-22. Officials
rarely trumpet their biases or announce animus. Evidence of such bias
typically requires discovery. By holding that the Court's prior decision in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly'4 8 mandated dismissal of a complaint that did not
make concrete and plausible allegations, Iqbal hindered plaintiffs' access to
the discovery needed to support such factual claims. Here, too, officials may
read the Court's decision as a signal that animus could prevail, as long as
officials were careful to launder their public statements.
Similarly, in Arar, the Second Circuit's reluctance to hold senior
officials accountable led the court to dismiss on plausibility-pleading
grounds claims that officials had denied Arar his right to a deportation
hearing and access to counsel. These claims concerned conduct within the
United States.14 9 Consequently, they did not require the sensitive
information regarding foreign sovereigns that led the court to preclude a
Bivens remedy. Nevertheless, having disposed of the central claims in the
case, the court had a substantial incentive to get rid of the rest.'5 0 Acting on
this incentive, the court ruled that the plaintiff had not shown concrete
evidence that senior officials intentionally truncated procedures. However,
the logic of the majority opinion on the rendition allegations undermined
its holding on the remaining claims. The majority declined to recognize a
Bivens remedy for the rendition claim because of the extraordinary
diplomatic maneuvering in the case.' 5 ' Those maneuvers culminated in
Arar's abrupt removal from the United States to Syria. If senior officials were
involved in the diplomacy, it seems reasonable to infer that they authorized
the truncated process that facilitated Arar's rendition.' 5 2 However,
preclusion of the Bivens claim based on Arar's extraordinary rendition paved
the way for disposal of the remaining claims.
2. Binary Options and False Dichotomies
The Arar court's discussion of the government's choices was also
categorical. The court presented the government's options as binary. On the
one side was extraordinary rendition to Syria. The other option was
146. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-52 (2009).
147. Id.
148. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
149. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F. 3 d 559, 569 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
3409 (2010).
150. See Bone, supra note 145, at 870 (noting that Iqbal reflects "an implicit policy judgment
... to screen suits more aggressively").
151. Arar 5 85 F.3 d at 5 74-75.
152. Id. at 615-ig (Parker, J., dissenting); cf id. at 594 (Sack, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the plaintiff had met the plausibility-pleading standard).
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permitting a suspected terrorist to "board his plane and go on to his
destination."'5 3 However, the court's stark portrait of policy options failed to
do justice to the options available. Officials could have detained Arar for a
reasonable period of time to properly gauge the nature of the threat, if any,
that he posed. Indeed, in Boumediene, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
a reasonable screening period might be appropriate for foreign nationals
apprehended outside the country and detained under effective U.S.
jurisdiction and control.154 Comparable authority would probably exist with
respect to foreign nationals like Arar detained at a port of entry.' 55 While
this path had been open to officials, it failed to appear on the court's radar
screen.
In Iqbal, Justice Kennedy hewed to this categorical approach. In
describing the round-up of undocumented Muslim noncitizens after
September 11th as a rational policy focused on persons with a "suspected
link to the attacks,"'5 6 Kennedy implied that the only alternative for officials
was to allow suspected terrorists to remain at large. However, the
government's own reports suggested that the round-up was far more chaotic
from the start. Prominent officials just below the most senior level
appreciated soon after the detentions began that virtually all the detainees
were routine immigration violators without terrorist ties.157
While officials knew early on that most detainees had no terrorist
connections, they also had ample access to reports that the detainees had
suffered significant abuse while in custody. 158 Officials at this juncture did
not have to choose between detaining suspected terrorists and releasing
them willy-nilly. Instead, their choice was between two more concrete
153. Id. at 580 (majority opinion). For more on extraordinary rendition, see Margaret L.
Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 1333 (2007).
154. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2275 (2008).
155. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695-96 (2001) (counseling greater deference to
the political branches when detention may be necessary to prevent terrorism in order to leave
"no unprotected spot in the Nation's armor" (quoting Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 334 U.S.
590, 602 (1953)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
156. Ashcroftv. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009).
157. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 3, at i i, 16-17 (recounting one tip
among 96,ooo received that identified the target only as working in a grocery store "operated
by numerous Middle Eastern men" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also ERIC
LICHTBLAU, BUSH'S LAw: THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 47-48 (2oo8) (describing then-
INS Commissioner James Ziglar's opposition to continued detentions). This disjuncture has
been characteristic of other mass detentions in American history, such as the Japanese-
American internment. PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983); ERIC L. MULLER, AMERICAN
INQUISITION: THE HUNT FORJAPANESE AMERICAN DISLOYALTY IN WORLD WAR II 116-21 (2007)
(analyzing government stereotypes in assessments of Japanese-Americans' loyalty); Joseph
Margulies, Evaluating Crisis Government, 40 CRIM. L. BULL. 627, 638-39 (2004) (discussing other
World War II-era restrictions targeting Asian-Americans and Pacific Islanders, including
imposition of martial law in Hawaii).
158. See, e.g., Hegstrom, supra note 131.
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options. On the one hand, officials could have deported undocumented
aliens in a timely fashion, while not turning a blind eye to abuses. The
alternative was the path that officials chose: protracted detention for aliens
who could have been safely deported and failure to address reports of abuse.
Officials would not have prejudiced national security by choosing the first
course. A simple memorandum that directed facility managers to treat
detainees humanely would have sufficed, and also provided compelling
evidence in defense of any subsequent Bivens action.159 By rejecting
supervisory liability, Iqbal signaled to senior officials that expressing and
documenting such concerns were responsibilities they could safely discount.
Judicial signaling of this kind exacerbates myopia with its neglect of future
costs and benefits.
3. Deference and Bureaucratic Decisionmaking
Deferential decisions also reinforce myopia because they view policy
decisions made without court intervention as a unitary, optimal baseline. In
reality, decisionmaking is often a group process,16 o with a spectrum of inputs
that are sensitive to either judicial intervention or deference. An official
considering a move such as extraordinary rendition of a suspected terrorist
will receive input from internal champions and opponents of this course.
Officials in the latter camp may argue that extraordinary rendition is a
myopic policy that will increase violence by alienating important global
audiences. Members of those constituencies will decide against working with
the United States or engaging in peaceful dissent, and will throw in their lot
with groups already allied against us.16' Deferential courts tend to assume
159. Indeed, the Court has required analogous prophylactic measures in other law-
enforcement contexts. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (noting that
Miranda warnings have "become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the
warnings have become part of our national culture").
16o. See GRAHAM T. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
55-61 (1971) (discussing group decisionmaking on responses to Soviet siting of missiles in
Cuba); ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THE ROLE OF
LAW 29-43 (1974) (same).
161. See also Letter from Gen. David H. Petraeus, Commanding Officer of Multi-National
Force-Iraq, to Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen Serving in Multi-
National Force-Iraq (May so, 2007), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/
nation/documents/petraeus.valueso 5oo7.pdf (noting strategic importance of U.S. forces'
compliance with legal norms); cf JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER: WHY
THE WORLD'S ONLY SUPERPOWER CAN'T Go IT ALONE 35 (2002) (warning that tactics perceived
as overreaching will result in the loss of "important opportunities for cooperation in the
solution of global problems such as terrorism"); Christopher J. Borgen, Essay, Hearts and Minds
and Laws: Legal Compliance and Diplomatic Persuasion, 5o S. TEX. L. REV. 769, 774-78 (2009)
(discussing importance of global reputation with both governing elites and citizenry of other
nations); Deborah N. Pearlstein, Form and Function in the National Security Constitution, 41 CONN.
L. REv. 1549, 1605 (2009) ("[T]he prisoner abuse scandals have produced predominately
negative consequences for U.S. national security."); Ganesh Sitaraman, Counterinsurgency, the
War on Terror, and the Laws of War, 95 VA. L. REv. 1745, 1803 (2009) (discussing importance of
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that their stance will permit the policy debate to proceed unimpaired.16 2
However, the dynamics of executive-branch decisionmaking spur doubts.
Despite common assertions that lawsuits chill vigorous responses to
threats,'6 3 deferential decisions may impose a deeper chill on myopia's
internal opponents. Bureaucratic opponents already face intra-institutional
costs, particularly in the aftermath of crisis. Hawks within the agency may
question opponents' regard for the public's safety.' 64 They may also label
opponents as captives of an antiquated precrisis mentality. As a result,
opponents may be taken out of the loop on sensitive questions or abstain
from the debate, even when the institution would be better off heeding their
advice.165 Viewed in this light, a deferential court decision is not "neutral"; it
serves to hinder internal dissent.' 66 The result is a mix of inputs 67 that tilts
toward unduly risk-seeking behavior. Over time, behavior of this kind will
exacerbate volatility by triggering a backlash toward undue risk-aversion.168
winning over populations in counterterrorism efforts); Philip Zelikow, Legal Policy for a Twilight
War, 30 HoUs.J. INT'L L. 8g, 92 (2007) (arguing that legal policy on interrogation and related
issues must consider "enforcement of international, criminal, or civil law and the policies for
the effective administration ofjustice").
162. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3 d 559' 580 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (disclaiming any
intent to suggest that rendition is a sound policy), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010).
163. See Schuck, supra note i i.
164. See What Went Wrong: Torture and the Office of Legal Counsel in the Bush Administration:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the S. judiciary Comm., iii th
Cong. 662-89 (2009) (statement of Philip Zelikow, White Burkett Miller Professor of History,
University of Virginia) (discussing reaction among some White House officials when Zelikow,
former director of 9/11 Commission and then-counselor to Secretary Rice, circulated a memo
in 2005 detailing problems with the United States' legal position on interrogation);
GOLDSMITH, supra note 8, at 7x (recounting anger of Vice President Cheney's counsel, David
Addington, at author's refusal to endorse "an important counterterrorism initiative";
Addington told Goldsmith that "the blood of the hundred thousand people who die in the next
attack will be on your hands");JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY ON HOW THE WAR
ON TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS 316-18 (2oo8) (describing resistance by
officials serving under Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, such as Legal Advisors John
Bellinger, Matthew Waxman, and Philip Zelikow, to efforts to temper U.S. interrogation policy
during President Bush's second term); Zelikow, supra note 161, at 92 (discussing Zelikow's
2005 memo).
165. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, ExIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 4-5 (1970) (arguing that
organizations can benefit when dissenters use "voice" to address disagreement, rather than
exit" by keeping silent or leaving altogether).
166. See Gregory S. McNeal, A Retrospective on the Military Commission: Organizational Culture,
Professional Ethics and Guantanamo, 42 CASE W. RES.J. INT'L L. 125, 129-34 (2009) (discussing
robust culture of resistance to political influence within military); cf Lobel, supra note 26, at
459-60 (discussing functional benefits organizations obtain through internal dissent); Peter
Margulies, True Believers at Law: Legal Ethics, National Security Agendas, and the Separation of Powers,
68 MD. L. REV. 1, 33-34 (2oo8) (discussing blind spots in national security decisionmaking).
167. For a groundbreaking study on randomness in policymaking, see Michael D. Cohen,
James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice, 17 ADMIN. Scl.
Q. 1 (1972).
i68. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 8, at 124-25, 134-35.
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In contrast, a decision that denies policymakers categorical impunity may
strengthen internal dissenters' resolve and enhance overall deliberation.' 69
4. The Whistleblower's Revenge
The categorical-deference approach also fails to acknowledge that those
stymied by the lack of formal redress can substitute for litigation other paths
that pose greater danger. For example, consider the perspective of the
official who leaks a document, not to advance a personal agenda, but to
focus public attention on government policy.170 Whistleblowers of this kind,
like Daniel Ellsberg, who leaked the Pentagon Papers to the New York
Times,' 7' are advancing a constitutional vision of their own in which senior
169. See generally Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361,
1412-18 (2009) (discussing institutional barriers to sound decisionmaking within the executive
branch). The success of bureaucratic opponents of myopia grew in President Bush's second
term, occurring after court decisions that imposed accountability on the executive branch. See
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (requiring due process for a U.S. citizen-detainee);
cf. MAYER, supra note 164, at 316-18 (discussing the pace and timing of bureaucratic
opposition).
While courts practicing categorical deference exalt executive-branch decisionmaking,
they take a stilted view of plaintiffs. In Arar, the court made much of the plaintiffs ability to
secure an unfair advantage on the merits by threatening "graymail"; i.e., the disclosure of
sensitive national security information. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F. 3 d 559, 578-80 (2d Cir.
2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2o1o). The court painted the plaintiff as being
interested largely in payment and political posturing. Id. Filling out the details of this off-
putting portrait, it reduced a congressional hearing on the case to another lucrative
opportunity for the litigant. See id. at 58o n.13 ("It is telling that ... Mr. Arar and his attorney
went to the United States Congress and requested-without success-that it. . . 'give [Mr. Ararl
reparations.'" (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 49, Arar, 585 F-3 d 559 (No. 06-4216-
CV)). However, reducing such mobilization efforts to the quest for cash ignores the gains of
public education and the official accountability that these efforts produce. The same hearings
that provoked the majority's caricature of the plaintiff also provided a forum for Secretary of
State Rice to admit that the government had "mishandled" Arar's case. See Scott Shane, On
Torture, 2 Messages and a High Political Cost, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2007, at Ai8. Since Secretary
Rice did not make such concessions lightly, the Secretary's acknowledgment buttressed Arar's
narrative of horrendous abuse. A less categorical court would see value in such accountability,
which might not have occurred without the pendency of Arar's lawsuit. See generally Muneer I.
Ahmad, Resisting Guantanamo: Rights at the Brink of Dehumanization, 03 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1683
(2009) (discussing advocacy efforts to promote accountability for treatment of detainees). The
Arar court's jaundiced view of the plaintiff clashes with the depiction of habeas petitioners as
keeping the government honest. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2275 (2008).
Ironically, these opposing portraits of litigants actually depict the same person. Today's
detained habeas petitioner is tomorrow's Bivens plaintiff-only the time frame is different.
170. See Michael Isikoff, The Fed Who Blew the Whistle, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 22, 2008, at 40, 48
(reporting that Department ofJustice attorney Thomas M. Tamm acted as the source for New
York Times reporters who wrote about the government's warrantless Terrorist Surveillance
Program ("TSP")).
171. See Adam Liptak, Keynote Address: Secret Evidence in the Age of National Security, 5
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICsJ. 93 (2006).
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officials have strayed from the limits of the original understanding.'72 If the
courts and Congress do not work to restore the balance, the whistleblower
engages in self-help. Because leakers are risk-seekers who believe the status
quo is unacceptable, they lack courts' interest in safeguarding sensitive
information. Policy shaped by blowback from leaks is far more volatile than
policy reacting to judicial precedent.1 73
Similarly, the media has a constitutional role to play that includes
investigative reporting. The media will step up its efforts if other institutions
like courts take a more deferential stance.' 74 When government hides
information, the media's sense of its own role leads to greater distrust of
government and a willingness to both uncover and publish more
information. On some occasions, the First Amendment will oblige us to
tolerate journalists' disclosure of operational details of covert programs. 75
Journalists will understandably view government's claims that information is
sensitive with greater skepticism when government has methodically locked
down information in other settings. Similarly, shutting off damage suits
regarding terrorism issues leaves other kinds of litigation, including
litigation the government has initiated. Journalists and activists will seek to
scrutinize and mobilize around these cases, even if the avenue of civil suits is
closed. Indeed, activism may be distorted in these other venues when they
are the only game in town. For example, journalists may be more inclined to
credit even outlandish claims made by some lawyers on behalf of detainees
when the government has a track record of concealing information.7 6
172. See KRAMER, supra note 14; see also Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983) (discussing how individuals and groups formulate and articulate
constitutional visions in opposition to the prevalent governmental view); David E. Pozen, Deep
Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 280 (2010) ("Unauthorized leaks typically occur when a secret-
keeper is unhappy with the activities of colleagues and cannot have her position vindicated
internally.").
173. The Court has not protected internal whistleblowers, who therefore become even
more likely to take their concerns to the larger public. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410
(2006) (holding that adverse job actions taken against a prosecutor who complained internally
about the alleged mishandling of a case did not violate the First Amendment); see also Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 8oo (1982) (holding that an official who had allegedly conspired to take
adverse job action against Pentagon whistleblowers was entitled to qualified immunity); cf
Lobel, supra note 26, at 451-55 (discussing Garcetti and arguing for greater coherence in law
regarding whistleblowers).
174. See LICHTBILAU, supra note 157, at 154-55 (reporting on the efforts of the author, one
of two New York Times reporters who broke the story about TSP); Peter Margulies, The Detainees'
Dilemma: The Virtues and Vices ofAdvocacy Strategies in the War on Terror, 57 BuFF. L. REV. 347, 383-
85 (2009).
175. See Dana Priest, Jet Is an Open Secret in Terror War, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 2004, at Ai
(discussing logistics of renditions of suspected terrorists).
176. See H. Candace Gorman, The Hippocratic Oath Dies in Gitmo, IN THESE TIMES, Mar. 2008,
http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/354o/the-hippocratic-oathdies-in-.gitmo/ (discussing
how a lawyer supported the insinuation that a detainee contracted AIDS at Guantanamo by
asserting that the detainee had arrived at Guantanamo Bay in healthy condition, but
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While some might argue that courts should not speculate about future
conduct of third parties, a court that makes empirical predictions about the
effect of liability should not selectively ignore major unintended
consequences of its holding.
There are parallel developments in international law. Some countries
have prosecuted criminal cases against American agents who allegedly were
complicit in extraordinary renditions. In Italy, a number of American
government employees and personnel were convicted in absentia because of
legal action generated by popular pressure.177 U.S. public-interest
organizations, like the Center for Constitutional Rights, have encouraged
these assertions of universal jurisdiction. These prosecutions occurred
because of officials' sense that they were above the law. Judicial remedies
available in the United States can check these officials, thereby reducing the
incidence and impact of universal-jurisdiction proceedings in the future.
B. INTERVENTIONIST COURTS
If categorical deference is problematic because it fails to address
presentism, categorical interventionism is problematic because it does not
acknowledge hindsight bias. Categorical interventionism has resulted in
lower courts inappropriately finding that officials could not meet the
standard for qualified immunity.'7 8 Categorical interventionism has two
pernicious effects. First, it entails hindsight bias that distorts official
incentives. Second, such decisions in lower courts drive the Supreme Court
to the other extreme of categorical deference in order to police
inappropriate interventionism.179
subsequently the doctors there told the detainee that he had AIDS); see also Nicholas D. Kristof,
Op-Ed., A Prison of Shame, and It's Ours, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2oo8, at WKi 3 (reporting allegation
that doctors had told detainee he had AIDS); cf Al-Ghizzawi v. Bush, No. 05-23 78(JDB), 2008
WL 948337, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2008) (noting that lawyer had conceded inaccuracy of her
most serious charges); Margulies, supra note 174, at 391-93 (critiquing lawyer's approach).
177. See Rachel Donadio, Italy Convicts 23 Americans, Most Working for C.I.A., of Abducting
Muslim Cleric, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2oog, at A15. These prosecutions are not necessarily
productive avenues for reforming U.S. practices. They may prompt a backlash by domestic
constituencies concerned about possible hindsight bias among foreign or transnational
tribunals. See Margulies, supra note 174, at 393-99.
178. See al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3 d 949 (9 th Cir. 2009), cert. granted 79 U.S.L.W. 3062
(U.S. Oct. 18, 2010) (No. 1o-98); Padilla v.Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 005, 1031 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
179. Policing the lower courts was a prime rationale for the Court's modification of the
qualified immunity test, see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 8oo (1982), and for its recent
adoption of more stringent pleading rules, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). See also
Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365 (2oo8) (holding that the equitable
principle of balancing hardships precluded issuance of a preliminary injunction against naval
training exercises that allegedly harmed marine mammals, thereby preventing undue intrusion
on the military); Jared A. Goldstein, Equitable Balancing in the Age of Statutes, 96 VA. L. REV. 485,
486-go (2010) (criticizing Winter).
Scholars continue to debate the success and impact of Bivens litigation. One insightful
commentator has argued that the government's indemnification of most Bivens defendants and
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1. Intervention and Time's Omniscience
Interventionist decisions share with deferential rulings a categorical
view of time. In deferential decisions, courts have viewed time solely from
the standpoint of the earliest official option, thus masking more moderate
options that developed in the intermediate term. In contrast, interventionist
courts adopt the temporal perspective of a court pondering the matter after
the crisis has passed. With the omniscience hindsight bias offers, the
government's response to national security challenges often seems
overwrought.
To illustrate this categorical view of time, consider al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, in
which the Ninth Circuit held that Attorney General John Ashcroft had
violated the rights of the plaintiff, whom the government had detained as a
material witness in a terronsm investigation. so The plaintiff had received
$20,000 from an individual indicted for terrorist activity, Sami Al-
Hussayen,18 1 and had met with that individual's associates after returning
from a trip to Yemen.182 At the time of his arrest pursuant to a material-
witness warrant, the plaintiff was about to board a flight to Saudi Arabia.' 83
The government released al-Kidd after two weeks, but did not call him as a
witness at Al-Hussayen's trial, which occurred over a year after the plaintiffs
arrest. '8
The majority in al-Kidd seemed to view the government's failure to call
al-Kidd as proof that his detention as a material witness was purely pretextual
and lacking in probable cause.' 85 According to the majority, the government
the impact of qualified immunity erode any deterrent such litigation serves. See Cornelia T.L.
Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public Officials' Individual Liability Under
Bivens, 88 GEO. L.J. 65 (1999). However, public officials also care about their reputations. A
congressional subpoena to an official to explain the facts behind a lawsuit still has an impact. See
Shane, supra note 169 (reporting on the congressional hearing regarding the Arar
extraordinary-rendition case, featuring testimony from Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice,
who had not yet assumed her post when the alleged events took place); see also Zaring, supra
note 21, at 317, 331-33 (discussing links between Bivens suits and policy advocacy). See generally
Margulies, supra note 174, at 364-71 (discussing advocacy repertoire of lawyers for detainees,
which includes media relations and community education as well as litigation). A recent
empirical investigation asserts that Bivens actions succeed far more often than scholars had
previously supposed and that qualified immunity rarely plays a dispositive role. See Alexander A.
Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences for the Individual Liability
Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 8og-1o (2010).
i8o. al-Kidd, 580 F.3 d 949.
181. Id. at 982 (BeaJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I82. Id. at 952 (majority opinion).
183. Id. at 952- 5 3.
184. Id. at 953-54. Al-Hussayen was acquitted of the most serious charges. The district
court declared a mistrial on the other counts in the indictment. The government ultimately
deported Al-Hussayen to Saudi Arabia after he admitted making misrepresentations in
immigration documents. Id. at 953 n.4.
185. Id. at 963-64.
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had detained the plaintiff solely to investigate his own possible involvement
in a terrorist conspiracy.'8 6 However, the roles of target and witness are not
mutually exclusive in conspiracy cases. Suspected participants often have
useful information, and the difference between target and witness can hinge
on the passage of time.' 8 7 Forcing the government to choose at an early
point in the case hamstrings enforcement. In al-Kidd, the facts conceded by
the parties suggested that al-Kidd possessed relevant information, which
might have been lost to the government if the plaintiff had traveled to Saudi
Arabia.' 8 8 Nevertheless, for the majority in al-Kidd, the government could
have dodged liability only by allowing the plaintiff to board the plane. This
was the very choice that the Second Circuit in Arar cited in precluding a
Bivens claim.' 89
186. Id. at 970.
187. See Peter Margulies, Legal Hazard: Corporate Crime, Advancement of Executives' Defense
Costs, and the Federal Courts, 7 U.C. DAvis Bus. L.J. 55, 107-09 (2oo6) (discussing how
cooperation at the corporate level can facilitate institutional reform); Daniel C. Richman,
Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 69, 69-71 (1995) (discussing cooperation and legal ethics);
Michael A. Simons, Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and Atonement, 56 VAND. L. REV.
1, 33-42 (2003) (arguing that cooperation can be a reflection of remorse and atonement,
instead of a merely utilitarian calculus); Michael A. Simons, Vicarious Snitching: Crime,
Cooperation, and "Good Corporate Citizenship,"76 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 979, 992-95 (2002) (same);
Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 563, 614 (1999) (discussing
treatment of cooperators under federal sentencing guidelines). But see Ellen Yaroshefsky,
Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L.
REv. 917, 931-33 (1999) (describing incentives for dishonesty among cooperators).
188. al-Kidd, 58o F-3 d at 982 (Bea,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Moreover,
there are many reasons why the government decides not to call particular witnesses. These
include the availability of other sources and the taking of plea deals. Id. at 993. The selection of
witnesses at trial is also a core element of the prosecutor's advocacy function, which typically
enjoys absolute immunity. Compare id. at 957-63 (majority opinion) (rejecting absolute
immunity), with Koubriti v. Convertino, 593 F-3 d 459, 466-69 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that a
prosecutor had absolute immunity against a claim that he failed to disclose exculpatory
evidence in a terrorism case), cert. denied, No. 09-1322, 2010 WL 1739236 (U.S. Oct. 4, 2010).
189. The majority discounted Supreme Court precedent by asserting that the government's
motive in detaining al-Kidd rendered an otherwise legal detention unlawful. See al-Kidd, 58o
F.3 d at 967-68 (distinguishing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 8o6, 813 (1996) (holding that
a police officer's motive was irrelevant under the Fourth Amendment as long as probable cause
supported the search)). The majority's eagerness to second-guess the defendants was also
evident in its use of dicta from another circuit. To establish that the defendants had violated
clearly settled law, the majority cited a Second Circuit case that actually upheld the material
witness detention of an individual who knew two of the 9/11 hijackers. See id. at 970 (citing
United States v. Awadallah, 349 F. 3 d 42, 59 (2d Cir. 2003) (suggesting that while detention was
appropriate on those facts, law did not support material witness detention for purposes of
criminal investigation)). The search for clearly settled law should not end with dicta. Moreover,
the majority conveniently failed to cite dicta from the same circuit suggesting that the
government might have discretion to detain an individual as a material witness in a terrorism
case. See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F-3 d 695, 724 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that alleged enemy
combatant could be detained, if appropriate, as a material witness), rev'd on other grounds, 542
U.S. 426 (2004). While this second helping of dicta is hardly conclusive authority for the
defendants, it indicates that the law was not clearly against them. That said, al-Kidd would have
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A similarly stark view typifies Padilla v. Yoo,igo in which erstwhile alleged
enemy combatant Jose Padilla sued former Justice Department attorney
John Yoo, who drafted many of the Bush Administration's memos on
detention and interrogation.' 9 ' A raft of commentators has rightly criticized
Yoo's aggressively unilateralist view of executive power and strained use of
statutory analogies.19 2 It is tempting to start from the accurate premise that
Yoo's work enabled much of the Bush Administration's overreaching, 93 and
had a far stronger argument if the government had failed to show probable cause for his
detention. Moreover, as a policy matter, material-witness detention should be a last resort, used
in cases where a witness may otherwise resort to flight, particularly flight to another country,
which will pose legal and logistical difficulties for compulsory process. See Peter Margulies,
Detention of Material Witnesses, Exigency, and the Rule of Law, 40 CRIM. L. BULL. 599, 6oo (2004).
For a balanced and insightful analysis, see Orin Kerr, al-Kidd v. Ashcroft: Is Pretextual Use of the
Material Witness Statute Unconstitutional?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 7, 2009, 12:53 PM),
http://volokh.com/archives/archive-2oog9og9o6-200-_0912.shtml#1252123900.
190. 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
191. See, e.g., Memorandum from Jay Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
John Rizzo, Acting Gen. Counsel, CIA (Aug. 1, 2002), http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/
olc/zubaydah.pdf. For a comprehensive discussion and critique of the Office of Legal Counsel
memos, including those that specifically authorized waterboarding and other "enhanced
interrogation techniques," see PETER MARGULIES, LAw's DETOUR: JUSTICE DISPLACED IN THE
BUsH ADMINISTRATION 59-66 (201o). For a historical analysis of American policy on
interrogation at home and abroad, see JOHN T. PARRY, UNDERSTANDING TORTURE 135-51
(2010), andJohn T. Parry, Torture Nation, Torture Law, 97 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1004-31 (2009).
192. See HAROLD BRUFF, BAD ADVICE: BUSH'S LAWYERS IN THE WAR ON TERROR (2009);
David Luban, The Torture Lawyers of Washington, in LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 162, 176-
8o, 200-02 (2007); Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum, i J.
NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 455 (2005); Stephen Gillers, Legal Ethics: A Debate, in THE TORTURE
DEBATE IN AMERICA 236, 237-38 (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2005); Margulies, supra note 166;
Cassandra Burke Robertson, Beyond the Torture Memos: Perceptual Filters, Cultural Commitments, and
Partisan Identity, 42 CASE W. RES.J. INT'L L. 389 (2009); W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the
Separation of Law and Morals, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 67, 8o-85 (2005); cf Sudha Setty, No More
Secret Laws: How Transparency of Executive Branch Legal Policy Doesn't Let the Terrorists Win, 57 U.
KAN. L. REV. 579 (2009) (discussing need for disclosure of legal-policy positions); Norman W.
Spaulding, Professional Independence in the Office of the Attorney General, 6o STAN. L. REV. 1931,
1975-76 (2008) (noting role of ideology in Yoo's advice). The Justice Department recently
decided against referring Yoo's case to state-bar authorities, although it criticized his unduly
aggressive view of the law. See Memorandum from David Margolis, Assoc. Deputy Att'y Gen., to
the Att'y Gen. & Deputy Att'y Gen. (Jan. 5, 2010), http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/
DAGMargolisMemo ooso5.pdf.
193. For accounts that discuss the issues with law and policy during this period, see
GOLDSMITH, supra note 8 (arguing that the Bush Administration failed to recognize the need
for buy-in from other branches of government), BENJAMIN WITTEs, LAW AND THE LONG WAR:
THE FUTURE OFJUSTICE IN THE AGE OF TERROR (2008) (arguing for a greater role for Congress
in setting standards on detention), and Richard Abel, Contesting Legality in the United States After
September iI, in FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM: COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF THE LEGAL
COMPLEX AND POLITICAL LIBERALISM 361 (Terence Halliday, Lucien Karpik & Malcolm Feeley
eds., 2008) (arguing that courts and the legal profession struggled after September ii th to
protect values of accountability and individualized adjudication crucial to the rule of law).
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then reverse-engineer legal vehicles to make him accountable.194 Indeed,
poetic justice seems to virtually dictate this result, given Yoo's inclination to
employ a similar approach with suspected terrorists. The court surrendered
to this understandable temptation, finding that Yoo was not entitled to
qualified immunity. However, precedent requires more.
While deferential decisions seem to shield all officials, Padilla hurtled to
the other extreme, targeting an official for harms lacking a clear link to the
defendant's conduct. The simple facts of geography underline this lack of
linkage.195 Yoo limited his advice to detainees outside the United States.19 6
The government detained Padilla, a U.S. citizen, within the United States. All
of Yoo's most controversial formal advice on interrogation, therefore,
excluded Padilla by its terms.' 9 7
The Padilla decision also presented a mirror image of the deferential
courts' view of time. In rejecting Yoo's claim of qualified immunity, the
court took the leisurely perspective marked by Padilla's conviction in federal
court in 2007.198 From this perspective, efforts to detain Padilla outside the
criminal justice system appeared both lawless and unnecessary. In accord
with this omniscient vantage point, the court declined to credit a Fourth
194. This is a perennial lure for both the left and right in American jurisprudence. See
BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RuLE OF LAW (2006).
195. Portions of this discussion are based on analysis in Margulies, supra note 174, at 410-
11.
196. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE
ROAD TO ABu GHRAIB 172, 172 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) (limiting
advice to "conduct of interrogations outside of the United States"). A more recent memo by
Yoo contained the same territorial limitation. See Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy
Assistant Att'y Gen., to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Def. (Mar. 14, 2003),
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/yoo-army-torture memo.pdf.
197. The Padilla court sought to restore the nexus by asserting that Yoo had written that he
was closely involved in Padilla's case and had advised the government to detain Padilla as an
enemy combatant. See Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1014, 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
(quoting JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS 15, 38-39 (2006)). For all those who rightly
deplored Yoo's lawyering, playing "gotcha" never seemed so sweet. However, while Yoo's book is
principally an exercise in polemic and self-promotion, the quotes from the volume do not bear
the weight the court's opinion demanded. Yoo nowhere suggested that he had authorized
behavior that Padilla alleged, such as "threats to cut [Padilla] with a knife and pour alcohol into
the wounds," see id. at 1013, or that he had knowledge of such conduct if it had occurred.
Indeed, Padilla seemed to concede this point in his pleadings, which characterized Yoo's
conduct in the vaguest terms. See Complaint at 13, 20, Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (No. C o8-
0035 JSW), 2oo8 WL 135201 (claiming that Yoo had "fostered" a "climate" that violated
Padilla's rights); First Amended Complaint at 9, 12, Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (No. C o8-
0035 JSW), 2oo8 WL 2433172 (claiming that Yoo "encouraged" and gave a "green light" to
such tactics). Padilla's allegations regarding Yoo's level of knowledge of the particulars of his
interrogation do not meet Iqbals standard and would cry out for summary judgment even
under an unreconstructed notice-pleading regime.
198. See Abby Goodnough & Scott Shane, Padilla Is Guilty on All Charges in Terror Trial, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 17, 2007, at Ai.
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Circuit decision holding that the government had authority to detain
Padilla.'99 The Padilla court held that this precedent did not show that
Padilla's rights were uncertain at the time of the conduct cited in his
pleadings, although the court undercut its analysis with the
acknowledgement that "the legal framework relating to [Padilla] ... was
developing at the time of the conduct alleged in the complaint."2 0 In short,
the Padilla court adopted a temporal perspective as categorical as the one
adopted in Arar, although one located at the other end of the timeline.2 0
2. The Attack of the Drones
Interventionist decisions like al-Kidd and Padilla demonstrate the same
failure to grapple with substitutions that marks the categorical-deference
model. Officials who feel unduly constrained by the hindsight bias of
interventionist courts have substitutions at their disposal. Those officials can
seek to practice a kinder, gentler version of rendition of detainees to third
countries. 20 2 Suppose that courts intervene to make renditions more
difficult,203 at least where the primary purpose of the rendition is subjecting
19g. See Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3 d 386 (4 th Cir. 2005). Indeed, the Supreme Court twice
rejected the opportunity to rule on Padilla's rights. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426
(2004) (declining to reach the merits on the ground that the courts in the Second Circuit,
where Padilla had initially brought his habeas petition, lacked jurisdiction). The Court should
have reached the merits and ruled that the government could not continue to hold Padilla as
an enemy combatant without a far more extensive factual showing. See Peter Margulies, Judging
Terror in the "Zone of Twilight": Exigency, Institutional Equity, and Procedure After September i1, 84
B.U. L. REV. 383, 408-31 (2004); cf Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the "War on
Terror," io8 COLUM. L. REV. 1013, 1032-49 (2oo8) (critiquing the Supreme Court's
jurisdictional holding in Padilla's case).
200. Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1036-37 (emphasis added). For an incisive critique of the
failure of the Padilla court to follow the applicable legal standard or acknowledge the policy
rationale for qualified immunity, see Peter H. Schuck, Immunity, Not Impunity, AM. LAw., Nov.
2oog, at 51.
201. While the interventionist tack of the Padilla court was misguided, the categorical
deference sought by the Justice Department in the case would be equally inappropriate. In an
amicus brief, the Justice Department argued that "special factors counseling hesitation" should
preclude a Bivens claim against any executive-branch lawyer providing national security advice.
See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, Padilla v. Yoo, No. og-16478 (9th Cir. Dec. 3,
2009), available at http://www.harpers.org/media/image/blogs/misc/dojamicus.pdf. This
argument is a bridge too far, since it would encourage reckless or intentionally unlawful advice.
202. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008) (declining to halt detainee's transfer to Iraq
for purposes of criminal prosecution); see also James E. Baker, A Running Start: Getting "Law
Ready"During a Presidential Transition, 3o A.B.A. NAT'L SECURrY L. REP., Sept./Oct. 2008, at 2, 6
(positing that making detention more difficult will increase incidence of rendition).
203. For a recent decision wisely upholding a brief border detention, see Tabbaa v. Chertoff
50g F.3 d 8g, 93 (2d Cir. 2007) (rejecting constitutional challenge to government's brief
detention for questioning of individuals returning from conference on Islam in Canada, where
the court's in camera review confirmed that the government had specific intelligence that some
attendees at the conference associated with terrorist groups and that the conference would
allow terrorists to "coordinate operations, ... raise funds intended for terrorist activities, [and]
exchange ... travel or identification documents"); cf Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian
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the detainee to coercive interrogation. In that event, officials may substitute
a strategy of using lethal force, including the drone attacks that have
become commonplace in Pakistan over the past year.20 4
IV. AN INNOVATION-ELICITING MODEL
If both categorical deference and intervention are inappropriate to
manage the combination of presentism and hindsight bias, courts should
adopt an innovation-eliciting approach. This approach controls the volatility
that mars both categorical approaches by allowing officials the opportunity
to devise alternatives. Under the innovation-eliciting approach, the
government prevails prior to the qualified immunity stage if it shows that it
actually utilized less restrictive alternatives in (1) congruent cases that were
(2) proportionate in scope and (3) proximate in time to the case at issue.
Implementing alternatives buys officials greater flexibility in a particular
case. For example, suppose officials in the extraordinary rendition case Arar
v. Ashcroft confronted a similar case six months later in which they initially
detained a suspected foreign terrorist at a port of entry. In that case, the
officials determined after detaining and screening the individual that the
information they had received was inaccurate. The officials allowed the
individual to proceed to his destination, with notice to the receiving country.
Under the innovation-eliciting approach, submission of proof of this
implemented alternative would trigger dismissal of Arar's suit before the
qualified immunity phase.
To ensure that the proffered alternative scenario is not an outlier or red
herring, officials would have to meet the congruency, proportionality, and
temporal-proximity tests noted above. The congruency element would
require that officials proffer a materially similar case. This case would have
to entail stakes comparable to the case at bar. Comparable stakes would
demonstrate that officials were serious about the alternatives they pursued.
Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1130-31 (2009) (discussing Tabbaa as a reasonable
judicial response to exigent circumstances). See generally Schuck, supra note 200 (arguing a need
for broad immunity for officials to preserve the distinction between law and politics).
204. See Orin Kerr, Perceptions of Necessity and the Choice Between Killing and
Detaining/Interrogating Terrorist Suspects, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 24, 2009, 7:26 PM),
http://volokh.com/2oog/12/2 4 /perceptions-of-necessity-and-the-choice-between-killing-and-
detaininginterrogating-terrorist-suspects/; see also Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S.
Counterterrorism Strategy and Law, in LEGISLATING THE WAR ON TERROR: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM
346 (Benjamin Wittes ed., 2009) (discussing the historical development and current U.S.
position on targeted killing); William C. Banks & Peter Raven-Hansen, Targeted Killing and
Assassination: The U.S. Legal Framework, 37 U. RICH. L. REv. 667, 679--81 (2003) (discussing
international- and domestic-law justifications for targeted killing in carefully tailored
circumstances); cf Matthew C. Waxman, Detention as Targeting: Standards of Certainty and
Detention of Suspected Terrorists, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (2oo8) (discussing continuum between
detention and other tactics such as targeted killing). But see Richard Murphy & Afsheen John
Radsan, Due Process and Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 405 (2009) (arguing
for Bivens actions in cases of targeted killings and intra-executive review).
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In the extraordinary-rendition scenario, for example, the proffered case
rejecting rendition would have to involve individualized suspicion of
terrorist ties, not merely suspicion based on crude profiling criteria, such as
noncitizen status. Rejecting rendition in the latter case would be too easy.
Only rejecting rendition in the former case would demonstrate a sincere
commitment to reform.
Proportionality centers on the volume of claimed violations. If the case
at hand concerned a single transaction or occurrence, demonstration of one
alternative would suffice to meet the proportionality element. However, if
the case at hand involved multiple alleged deprivations of rights, officials
would have to show that they had implemented less restrictive alternatives of
a proportionate scope. For example, the officials in Ashcroft v. Iqbal who
arguably turned a blind eye to the horrendous conditions of confinement
the plaintiffs endured would have had to demonstrate that they had sought
to prevent abuses in a similarly large sample of cases involving
undocumented aliens suspected of terrorist ties.
Officials would also have to proffer implemented alternatives that were
proximate in time. Alternative cases that occurred more than a year before
or after could be outliers. Such cases could involve different officials whose
conduct was irrelevant to the responsibility of the defendants in the case at
bar. Indeed, earlier counterexamples could encompass previous
administrations, or officials terminated to make way for a more aggressive
approach. Citing such examples would show backsliding, not the refinement
of alternatives.
Fine-tuning each of these elements therefore enhances the potential for
evolution in policymakers' responses. Evolution of this kind aims for more
than a single counterexample. Ultimately, it seeks an entire regime of
reform. 20 5
A. THEORETICAL BASES FOR INNOVATION
The innovation-eliciting approach makes sense from an ex ante
perspective. Categorical deference and intervention both generate either
inappropriate risk-seeking or risk-aversion. In contrast, the innovation-
eliciting approach gives officials a stake in crafting more nuanced
alternatives. In a particular case, like the extraordinary rendition at issue in
Arar, the government may not have explored other options. However, if a
rule like the one described had been in place, the government would have
had a greater incentive to find such avenues. As in more formal
experiments, officials could have then examined the results of less intrusive
alternatives and decided dispassionately whether those results safeguarded
205. Cf Kathleen G. Noonan, Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Legal Accountability in
the Service-Based Welfare State: Lessons from Child Welfare Reform, 34 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 523, 562-
64 (2009) (discussing litigation that encourages experimentation in the child-welfare arena).
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national security. Put another way, the innovation-eliciting approach wagers
that officials encouraged to experiment with less intrusive alternatives will
resort to them first instead of turning immediately to a more brutal mode
such as extraordinary rendition.2o 6
The innovation-eliciting approach borrows from the literature on
remedying cognitive biases and regulatory failure. First, consider the
cognitive dimension. The focus on generating alternatives in the innovation-
eliciting approach is central to what psychologists call "debiasing" efforts.
Dislodging presentist and hindsight biases requires structures that enhance
deliberation and promote experimentation. Cultivating habits of
deliberation2 0 7  entails imagining alternatives. Groups that consider
alternatives are more willing to abandon their own preconceptions and shift
strategies to accommodate changing facts.2o 8 For example, studies suggest
that people can improve deliberation and free themselves from the
contamination of cognitive bias by imagining different outcomes.
Considering an opposite hypothesis can often undo "one-sided thinking."20 9
When litigants are asked to do a role-play exercise to consider the
perspective of their adversary, they develop a stake in seeing things
differently and add habits that enhance this aptitude. 2 1 0 Focusing on
concrete alternatives that have been implemented, rather than merely
206. For a balanced view of the efficacy of coercive interrogations by a former State
Department official and staff director of the 9/1 1 Commission, see Philip Zelikow, A Dubious
C.I.A. Shortcut, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 24, 2oog, at A27 (observing that information from
interrogations using "enhanced" techniques was "a critical part of the intelligence flow, but
rarely-if ever-affected a 'ticking bomb' situation").
207. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 33 (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962) ("Moral virtue
... is formed by habit, ethos.").
208. Cf Larrick, supra note 25 (explaining the tendency for group members to share errors
and the importance of diversity to maximize the success of group decisionmaking); Philip E.
Tetlock, Theory-Driven Reasoning About Plausible Pasts and Probable Futures in World Politics, in
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 12, at 749, 757-
6o (discussing close-call counterfactuals and possible defenses).
209. See Fischhoff, supra note 25 (discussing the importance of "task restructuring,"
including "asking [research] subjects to consider alternative explanations and contrary
evidence"); Timothy D. Wilson, David B. Centerbar & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and
the DebiasingProblem, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVEJUDGMENT, supra
note 12, at 185, 197; see also Chapman & Johnson, supra note 69 (noting that experiments
reduced anchoring bias, in which superficially similar information acts as a baseline for a later
decision, by asking subjects to consider features of the object or task at hand that differed from
the anchor). Other debiasing strategies, including simply educating people about biases
without seeking to restructure deliberation, do not work as well. See Cassandra Burke
Robertson, Judgment, Identity, and Independence, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1, 34-36 (2009).
210. See Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein & Samuel Issacharoff, Creating Convergence:
Debiasing Biased Litigants, 22 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 913 (1997).
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considering alternatives, enlists another bias-availability-which suggests
that people respond to concrete information better than abstraction. 21 1
One value of the innovation-eliciting approach is enhancing officials'
stake in institutional reform. Debiasing strategies succeed when subjects
perceive themselves as working with a peer group to enhance overall peer
decisionmaking. 2 1 2  Seeing peers work through alternatives creates
demonstration effects, as others believe that such benefits are possible and
wish to join the effort.213 It creates a stake in change, allowing subjects to
"own" institutional reforms. When parties feel that a procedural regime
treats them fairly, they expand their compliance and cooperation. 2 1 4
Increased stake also reduces the incidence of risk-seeking substitutions that
frustrate change. For example, in working with teens on risk behaviors such
as drunk driving, stressing the riskiness of the behavior has little effect.
Indeed, since teens tend to be risk-seeking, 215 stressing this element is
counterproductive. However, since teenagers also wish to conform to the
behavior of other teens, highlighting the surprisingly high base rates of
responsible behavior among teens has a positive impact.216
This approach echoes regulatory reform in environmental law.2 17
Polluters proliferate pollution because they enact a tragedy of the commons,
in which immediate self-interest triumphs over the public welfare.218
Polluters seeking to avoid costly investments in new technology use old
technology that compromises the public good of clear air. However,
traditional command-and-control mechanisms such as outright prohibitions
211. See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199,
212 (2006); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1085-90 (2000)
(discussing availability).
2 12. See Robyn M. Dawes et al., Cooperation for the Benefit of Us-Not Me, or My Conscience, in
BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 97 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 199o).
213. See Richard B. Stewart, States and Cities as Actors in Global Climate Regulation: Unitary vs.
Plural Architectures, 50 ARIz. L. REV. 681, 700-0 (2008) (arguing that granting state and local
governments flexibility on climate-change policies will promote intergovernmental learning).
214. Cf Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 857 n.28,
858, 863 (1984) (noting the EPA's views that the bubble concept encouraged voluntary
improvements in technology); Edward Rubin, The Citizen Lawyer and the Administrative State, 50
WM. & MARYL. REV. 1335, 1359 (2009) (discussing compliance and stake).
215. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005) (citing literature on risk-seeking
and cognition in teenagers to support striking down juvenile death penalty); see also Elizabeth S.
Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due Process, andjuvenile justice Policy, 83 N.C.
L. REV. 793, 811-17 (2005) (discussing literature on adolescent development and trial
competence).
216. SeeFischhoff, supra note 25, at 747.
217. See BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 103; Kagan, Gunningham & Thornton, supra note
26, at 73-74; cf Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Should Greenhouse Gas Permits Be Allocated on a
Per Capita Basis?, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 51, 76 (2009) (discussing optimal mix of ex ante and ex post
effects in cap-and-trade regime).
218. See Nash, supra note 45.
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on old technology are not effective, since polluters devote substantial effort
to undermining regulatory compliance and develop no shared stake in
regulation.219 Approaches that give polluters a cost incentive to develop new
technology and phase out old methods address both the tragedy of the
commons and regulatory efficacy. They give regulated industries a stake in
developing alternatives and elicit expertise that regulators lack.2 2 o
Similarly, "new governance" approaches that stress collaboration in
rulemaking channel the parties toward solving problems and away from the
adverse substitutions that litigation breeds.22 ' New-governance approaches
use the expertise of decisionmakers in regulated fields to develop solutions
that are innovative and efficient. Decisionmakers in regulated areas "own"
these decisions and work to promote compliance.222 Parallel initiatives have
219. See BARDACH &KAGAN, supra note 103.
220. See Nash, supra note 45, at 846-47; see also John S. Applegate, Bridging the Data Gap:
Balancing the Supply and Demand for Chemical Information, 86 TEx. L. REV. 1365, 1398-404 (2oo8)
(analyzing market-based models); Wendy Wagner, Using Competition-Based Regulation To Bridge
the Toxics Data Gap, 83 IND. L.J. 629, 64o-46 (2oo8) (discussing certification based on proof of
superiority of one toxic substance and accompanied by a possible ban of others). But see David
M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program? Replacing the Command and
Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289, 343-47 (1998) (noting
arguments for incentives while expressing skepticism that this approach will necessarily improve
compliance); Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages as Intermediate
Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239, 267 (2009) (arguing that properly calibrated retribution
through punitive damages serves important expressive interests and also promotes future
compliance). While this Article argues that damage suits against officials can be
counterproductive, the innovation-eliciting approach would promote changes in official
strategy. It would thus reject expansive grandfathering rules that protect decisions or practices
from changes in legal regimes. SeeJonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering and
Environmental Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source Review, sos Nw. U. L. REV. 1677,
1724-28 (2007) (criticizing Bush Administration proposals that grandfathered in more old
sources of emissions and permitted renovation instead of construction of new plants with
cleaner technology).
221. See Lobel, supra note 26, at 470-73; Orly Lobel, Lauyering Loyalties: Speech Rights and
Duties Within Twenty-First-Century New Governance, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245, 1246-51 (2009).
222. See AYRES & BRArTHWAITE, supra note 17, at 4-5, 35-41; see also Gary Coglianese,
Richard Zeckhauser & Edward Parson, Seeking Truth for Power: Informational Strategy and
Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 310-14 (2004) (discussing how regulators use
incentives to promote voluntary disclosure).
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encouraged experimentation in the delivery of social services22 3 such as
education,224 housing,2 25 child welfare,226 and criminal justice.2 2 7
The innovation-eliciting approach to national security torts has the
same dynamic. Officials with a short-term perspective can compromise
public goods, such as the United States' "soft power," in a system where
force has limits and goodwill is necessary to secure international
cooperation.228 However, damages claims that proceed too readily can
encourage efforts by officials to cover up matters, thereby frustrating
attempts at regulation.2 2 9 Encouraging innovation addresses this problem.
While cap-and-trade approaches give industrial polluters a cost incentive to
innovate and introduce new technology, an innovation-eliciting approach to
Bivens actions gives officials a litigation incentive to innovate in solving
national security problems. 2 3o
223. See William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to
Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127, 170-81 (2004) (outlining more flexible
approaches to defining community interests); cf Susan D. Carle, Progressive Lawyering in
Politically Depressing Times: Can New Models for Institutional Self-reform Achieve More Effective
Structural Change?, 3o HARV.J.L. & GENDER 323, 325-30 (2007) (describing more collaborative
models of advocacy); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1015, 1021 (2004) (discussing innovation in public-
interest litigation).
224. See Susan P. Leviton & Justin A. Browne, Students Schooling Students: Gaining Professional
Benefits While Helping Urban High School Students Achieve Success, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 359, 387-92
(2009) (discussing virtues of partnership between law-school clinic and small urban school with
flexible approach to governance structure and curriculum).
225. See Lisa T. Alexander, Stakeholder Participation in New Governance: Lessons from Chicago's
Public Housing Reform Experiment, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 117 (2009) (discussing
advantages of flexibility in new-governance paradigm, while also recommending preservation of
legal protections for subordinated groups).
226. See Noonan, Sabel & Simon, supra note 205, at 533-48.
227. See Katherine R. Kruse, Instituting Innocence Reform: Wisconsin's New Governance
Experiment, 2oo6 Wis. L. REV. 645 (highlighting merits of promoting flexibility and innovation
in reform of criminal justice processes such as interrogation and eyewitness identification).
228. See Borgen, supra note 161, at 774-78; NYE, supra note 161, at 35. For a discussion of
the need to consider international goodwill in the establishment and implementation of
military commissions, see Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Norm Internalization Through Trials for
Violations of International Law: Four Conditions for Success and Their Application to Trials of Detainees
at Guantanamo Bay, 31 U. PA.J. INT'L L. 427, 471-90 (2009) (arguing that military commissions
do not promote commitment to counterterrorism within global communities).
229. See Scott Shane, Prosecutor To Review Official Handling of C.IA. Tapes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
10, 2oo8, at A2 3 .
23o. As a remedial approach that will promote reform by leveraging stakeholders'
expertise, the model here also draws from the "metadoctrinal" conception of interpretation. See
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 38 (2001) (discussing norms and
values that help shape formulation of legal tests); Berman, supra note 96 (discussing factors that
shape legal standards in criminal procedure); Monaghan, supra note 96 (same); see also
Chesney, supra note 169 (applying metadoctrinal approach to national security law).
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B. APPLYING THE PARADIGM
Application of the innovation-eliciting paradigm would temper the
excesses of categorical deference and intervention. The results in Iqbal and
Arar would be different, with plaintiffs able to pursue their claims, at least
through the qualified immunity phase, and possibly beyond. The result in
Padilla v. Yoo would also change, ending the lawsuit prior to the qualified
immunity stage.
The congruency, proportionality, and temporal elements would often
work to temper categorical deference. Congruency would do most of the
work in Arar. The Arar result would be different if the government did not
show that it had used a less intrusive alternative to extraordinary rendition in
a similar case. Instead of dismissing the lawsuit, plaintiffs would have
reached the qualified immunity stage and tested whether intentional
rendition to a country that practiced torture violated "settled law." The
result would have heightened accountability for an indefensible practice.
Proportionality would temper categorical deference in other contexts.
For example, in Iqbal, senior officials would have had to show that after
September i i th they requested humane treatment of another comparably
large group of detained noncitizens from South Asia and the Middle East. If
officials had failed to make this showing, plaintiffs would have moved on to
the qualified immunity stage, where they would have been able to test the
legal sufficiency of officials' acquiescence in the abusive treatment of
detainees. In cases involving alleged mistreatment of Guantanamo
detainees, officials would have been able to avoid proceeding to the
qualified immunity stage with a proffer that treatment of a significant cohort
of Guantanamo detainees had complied with the Geneva Convention. 231
Absent this showing, the lawsuit would have continued.
In other cases, the temporal proximity of the proffered alternative
could play a dispositive role. In al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, for example, the
government would have to show that it had released a material witness in a
temporally proximate terrorist prosecution after taking his deposition.3 2
Without this showing, the plaintiff would have been able to continue the
litigation.
The government would have been able to use the innovation-eliciting
approach to secure a dismissal of Padilla prior to the qualified immunity
phase. In Padilla, the government would have argued that it had used a less
restrictive alternative-the criminal justice system-to incapacitate
significant numbers of terrorists. Specific examples would include the
231. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
art. 3(1), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 5 U.N.T.S. 287 (barring torture and cruel, inhuman,
and degrading treatment).
232. See United States v. Awadallah, 349 F-3d 42, 59-61 (2d Cir. 2003) (interpreting
statutory conditions for detention to secure witness's grand-jury testimony).
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planners of the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania;2 33James Ujaama,
who admitted to a plot to establish a terrorist training camp;2 34 and Zacarias
Moussaoui, who pleaded guilty to participation in the conspiracy that
yielded the 9/11 attacks.235 The total number of criminal defendants vastly
outnumbered the total of three people detained in the United States as
enemy combatants.23 6 Moreover, the criminal prosecutions were proximate
in time. The prosecutions showed that institutional competition between the
Justice Department and other parts of the government was working to
minimize the number of detainees and channel most cases through the
criminal justice system, with its many procedural safeguards.237 Courts would
still have the power to order appropriate relief for detainees on writs of
habeas corpus.23 8 However, detainees such as Padilla would not have
remedies under Bivens.239 The Justice Department's relative success in
intragovernmental contests would buy officials this flexibility.
233. Seeln re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3 d 93 (2d Cir. 2008).
234. See Matthew Preusch, National Briefing Northwest: Washington: 2-Year Term in Taliban
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2004, at As6 (noting Ujaama's plea, premised on his cooperation).
235. See United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3 d 263, 266 (4 th Cir. 2010) (affirming denial of
Moussaoui's motion to withdraw his guilty plea).
236. In addition to Padilla and Yaser Esam Hamdi, the government detained Ali Al-Marri,
who subsequently pleaded guilty to criminal charges. See Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3 d 213
(4 th Cir. 2oo8) (upholding AI-Marri's detention, while requiring due-process protections),
vacating as moot sub nom. AI-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009); John Schwartz, Plea
Agreement Reached with Agent for Al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2oog, at Ai6.
237. See Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the Challenge of
Unaffiliated Terrorism, 8o S. CAL. L. REV. 425, 429-33 (2007) (discussing competition between
criminal prosecution and detention models). See generally ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 140
(analyzing criminal prosecutions).
238. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2258 (2oo8); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507 (2004). For discussions of alternatives in the detention and adjudication of suspected
terrorists, see WITTES, CHESNEY & BENHALIM, supra note 138 (arguing that habeas courts since
Boumediene have failed to establish clear standards about who should be detained), ZABEL &
BENJAMIN, supra note 140 (arguing for criminal justice system as first resort), Robert Chesney &
Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 6o STAN. L.
REv. 1079 (2008) (arguing for convergence of paradigms entailing protection for classified
information and due-process safeguards), David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention,
Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 732-40 (2009) (arguing that the
Constitution would authorize detention of persons acting on behalf of al Qaeda or the Taliban
in hostilities against the United States, or members of these groups who played a "direct role in
furthering military ends"), Kevin E. Lunday & Harvey Rishikof, Due Process Is a Strategic Choice:
Legitimacy and the Establishment of an Article III National Security Court, 39 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 87
(2008) (recommending creation of national security court), and Waxman, supra note 204
(arguing for a regime with escalating procedural safeguards).
239. This result would not be a substantial departure from current law. Under proper
analysis of qualified immunity, a court would have dismissed Padilla's suit (and al-Kidd's) in any
event. See supra Part III.B.1-2 (discussing problems with decisions in al-Kidd and Padilla). The
analysis here would merely allow the government to seek termination of discovery at an earlier
point.
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V. CRITICISMS OF THE INNOVATION-ELICITING MODEL
The innovation-eliciting approach triggers a number of concerns. First,
one can argue that it gets ex ante incentives wrong and will actually
encourage risky substitutions. Second, because it stresses the ex ante
perspective of policymakers, it may give short shrift to the ex post value of
compensation. Third, from a more deferential standpoint, one could argue
that the approach unduly intrudes on executive-branch officials.
The innovation-eliciting approach may encourage strategic behavior
from policymakers. For example, if officials believe that next month they will
detain a hardened suspected terrorist who has valuable information but will
resist conventional interrogation, they may detain a less important suspect
today and treat that person with kid gloves to document that they
implemented alternatives. 240 Having "banked" this alternative, they would
then have a safe harbor (at least regarding damages claims) for the use of
tougher interrogation methods on the suspected terrorist they detain next
month.
While such strategic behavior is a legitimate concern, there is reason to
think it will be less significant in practice. First, civil liability is not the only
constraint on policymakers; criminal law and other constitutional remedies,
such as habeas corpus, also play a role. Second, officials in this scenario may
end up outsmarting themselves. As they use standard interrogation
techniques, such as building rapport with the subject, they may get more
useful information than they expect from the lower-level detainee.*4' Such
success will encourage use of proven interrogation techniques on higher-
value detainees as well. This development of best practices is the prime
rationale for the innovation-eliciting approach.
Progressive critics can also argue that the stress on ex ante perspectives
in the innovation-eliciting approach shortchanges the value of
compensation. In some situations, individuals who have suffered from
official conduct that violates legal norms will not be made whole. Such a
result seems to violate the age-old maxim ubi jus, ubi remedium-where there
is a right, there is a remedy. 242
This, too, is a powerful argument with several responses. First, if the
intuition about the ex ante effect of encouraging alternatives is correct, the
problem of compensation will largely be a transitional issue, since fewer
240. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 217 (analyzing perverse incentives created by a cap-
and-trade regime that reduces obligation for high-population states, who then have an incentive
to encourage further population growth and resulting overconsumption).
241. Veteran FBI interrogators used traditional interrogation methods to get information
from Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi. See MAYER, supra note 164, at 105-06. Al-Libi provided information
about al Qaeda camps and a plot to attack the American embassy in Yemen. Id. CIA operatives
later used more coercive techniques, which resulted in misinformation about links between
Saddam Hussein and September i ith. Id.
242. SeeVladeck, supra note 128.
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wrongs will be committed under an innovation-eliciting regime. The
problem of undercompensation will be no worse than the problem under
the qualified immunity doctrine, when the first generation of victims is left
remediless because official action did not violate clearly settled norms.
Second, compensation is always merely one goal among many, including
deterrence of future wrongdoing and repose for defendants. Statutes of
limitation and evidentiary privileges2 43 also hinder compensation on policy
grounds; however, the legal system views the trade-off as worthwhile. 2 44
Finally, the model does not preclude compensation in cases where senior
officials can demonstrate they employed alternatives. Victims simply have to
look elsewhere to obtain redress, including direct appeals to the political
branches. Political avenues have sometimes been productive when the courts
did not find a redressable wrong.24 5 Appeal to the political branches has
always been part of the democratic system and appeals here may also be
effective. Moreover, in many national security cases, where abusive treatment
while detained is part of the lawsuit, lower-ranking officials may be
answerable, even if senior officials are not. In suits involving the post-9/ 11
detainees, the government settled for considerable sums.24 6 So plaintiffs
received compensation even without Bivens liability for senior officials.
One could also argue that an innovation-eliciting approach would be
unduly intrusive on decisionmakers. In some situations, such as combat,
requiring documentation of alternatives would be burdensome. Avoiding
this prospect could push commanders in the field to be either
inappropriately risk-averse or risk-seeking, with the disadvantages attached
to either course.
Courts should tailor the innovation-eliciting approach to minimize
these concerns. In some cases, the government would be allowed to submit
evidence regarding such processes in camera and/or ex parte to avoid
security risks. 2 47 Courts should also preclude damage actions involving
military attacks overseas, where the stakes are highest for American
243. See Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 471 (7th Cir. 1984) (discussing
Federal Rule of Evidence 407, which bars evidence of subsequent repairs to promote "social
policy of encouraging people to take, or least not discouraging them from taking, steps in
furtherance of added safety").
244. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1733, 1789 (1991) (arguing that while having a
remedy for every right is an aspirational goal, pragmatic factors will always cause courts to fall
short).
245. For an example taken from American history, see the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1989 (2oo6)) (acknowledging injustice
of Japanese-American internment during World War II and providing compensation). Of
course, in such cases the political process may work slowly, which provides a strong argument
for judicial redress.
246. See Nina Bernstein, U.S. To Pay $1.2 Million to 5 Detainees over Abuse Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 3, 2oog, at A22.
247. Seeln re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Mr., 548 F.3 d 276 (2d Cir. 2008).
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personnel. Courts have typically used threshold or procedural-avoidance
mechanisms such as the political question doctrine to insulate such matters
from judicial second-guessing.48 They could continue this practice or rule
that such matters are committed to the unreviewable discretion of military
personnel. 249 This would minimize the intrusiveness of judicial involvement
and mitigate hindsight bias that would otherwise distort the process.
VI. CONCLUSION
Like most currency, the coin of constitutional remedies has two sides.
One side corrects myopia, using remedies such as habeas corpus to counter
officials' addiction to a short-term perspective. The other side tames
hindsight bias, limiting damages to head-off undue risk-aversion. However,
privileging either of these perspectives is a perilous choice. Courts should
address both biases. Without a comprehensive approach, we could end up
with the worst of both worlds: a remedies regime that stifles risk-taking when
the national interest requires it, yet perversely encourages it when less
drastic alternatives will serve.
Sadly, recent decisions on the availability of Bivens remedies for alleged
violations of constitutional rights in the war on terror live out the pessimistic
prophecy ventured above. Cases like Iqbal and Arar display a categorical
deference, depicting choices as binary. The Arar court insisted that officials
faced the stark choice between rendering a suspected terrorist to Syria for
torture and letting him board a plane peopled by unwary passengers. On the
other hand, cases like Padilla and al-Kidd manifest an equally categorical
interventionism as they ponder time from the convenient perch of
retrospect.
Clearly, a better way is needed. The innovation-eliciting approach
breaks with the categorical cast of both deferential and interventionist
decisions. Drawing from literature on debiasing cognitive flaws and
remedying regulatory failure, the innovation-eliciting approach focuses on
actual, implemented alternatives to the official-defendants' actions. That
focus gives officials a stake in developing and refining alternatives. When the
alternative dispositions are both proportional and proximate in time to the
actions at issue in the lawsuit, it rewards the official with dismissal of the
lawsuit prior to the qualified immunity phase. By encouraging the habit of
considering alternatives, the innovation-eliciting approach navigates
between undue risk-aversion and risk-seeking. This approach reduces path-
248. See El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 559 F-3 d 578 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(holding that a lawsuit against the United States for an attack on a pharmaceutical factory in
the Sudan that officials believed was tied to Osama bin Laden constituted a political question),
petition for cert. filed, 79 U.S.L.W. 3141 (U.S. Sep. 7, 2010) (No. 10-328); cf Brown, supra note
21, at 851 (discussing the relationship between the political question doctrine and a deferential
approach to Bivens actions that leaves decision about liability to Congress).
249. See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 66g, 681 (1987).
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dependence and controls the "pendular swings" in policy that Justice
Kennedy in Boumediene viewed as antithetical to the rule of law.
Ultimately, to paraphrase Justice Holmes, constitutional remedies, like
"all life[, are] an experiment."250 Remedial theories gamble the legal
system's integrity at every turn, whether they presume the availability of
damages or their absence. Rewarding experiments will strike a better
balance between liberty and security. Given the instability wrought by
current approaches to constitutional remedies, that gamble is worth the risk.
250. SeeAbrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,J., dissenting).
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